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THE LIVES OF JOHN MARSHALL
MICHAEL J. GERHARDT*
INTRODUCTION
Near the end of John Ford's masterpiece The Man Who Shot
Liberty Valence,' a newspaper reporter observes, "when the legend
becomes fact, print the legend."2 More than a few popular legends
about John Marshall have been printed as fact over the years: that
he was a zealous partisan committed to striking a blow at
Jeffersonian democracy (and of course at Thomas Jefferson
himself);' that he was a fine politician but a poor lawyer;4 that he
was a judicial activist and reactionary;5 and that he intellectually
* Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law, William and Mary Law School. B.A., Yale
University; M.Sc., London School of Economics; J.D., University of Chicago. I am grateful
for the helpful feedback I received from many participants in William and Mary Law
School's Symposium in honor of the bicentennial of the appointment of John Marshall as
Chief Justice of the United States, including Jack Balkin, Dave Douglas, Marty Flaherty,
Kent Newmyer, Stephen Presser, and Adrian Vermeule. I also greatly appreciate the
tireless and able research assistance of Paul Dame, William and Mary Law School Class of
2003.
1. THE MAN WHO SHOT LIBERTYVALENCE (Paramont Pictures 1962).
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., IV ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 488-89 (1919)
(asserting that "[tihe conclusion of his early manhood ... [was] that the people, left to
themselves, are not capable of self-government... [and that this view] had hardened, as life
advanced, into something like religious convictions"); ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEYTHEAMERICAN
SUPREIE COURT 31 (Sanford Levinson rev., 3d ed. 2000) (indicating that in overseeing Aaron
Burr's treason trial, Marshall was "provoked by the partisan heat of the moment and by his
hatred of Jefferson").
4. See, e.g., II BEVERIDGE, supra note 3, at 178-80 (citing contemporary accounts of
Marshall's poor technical legal knowledge); see also infra notes 107-09 and accompanying
text.
5. See, e.g., HI BEVERIDGE, supra note 3, at 111 (asserting that Marshall was ajudicial
activist and that in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), he "resolved to make
use of... unimportant litigation to assert, at the critical hour... the power of the Supreme
Court"); IV id. at 488 ("Marshall was reactionary and employed all his skill to defeat,
whenever possible, the plans and purposes of the radicals.").
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dominated the other justices with whom he served on the Court.6
Another popular legend holds that Marshall and Andrew Jackson
were implacable enemies, as reflected in Jackson's reputed remark,
"John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it."7
Legend further has it the Liberty Bell cracked upon announcing the
news of Marshall's death.8
None of these legends is factually correct-the Liberty Bell, for
instance, was already cracked when it announced Marshall's
death.' The proliferation of these and other legends nonetheless is
as good a demonstration as there is of Jack Balkin's astute
observation that judicial greatness is a function of the future's use
of the past.' ° From the moment Marshall died, one could have said
of Marshall, as Edwin Stanton said of Lincoln at the moment he
succumbed to an assassin's bullet, "now he belongs to the ages.""
The objective of this Article is to provide an overview of what the
ages have made of John Marshall. My concern is not his life but his
image. Hence, I place greater emphasis on how his image has been
6. See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST
HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1889, at 196 (1982) (asserting Marshall "impressed thirty-four years
of constitutional decision with his own personality as no one else has ever come close to
doing"); BENJAMIN FLETCHER WRIGHT, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 28
(Greenwood Press 1982) (1938) (recognizing Marshall's "personal dominance of the Court");
Richard A. Posner, The Accidental Jurist, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 17, 2001, at 36
(reviewing R. KENTNEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALLAND THE HEROICAGE OFTHE SUPREME COURT
(2001)) (asserting "Marshall dominated the Court').
7. President Jackson's comment supposedly was prompted by the decision in Worcester
v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). There is, however, no evidence indicating that Jackson
ever made the remark first attributed to him by Horace Greely two decades after Jackson's
death. See DAVID GETCHES ETAL., FEDERALINDIAN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 1993)
(citing HORACE GREELY, AMERICAN CONFLICT 106 (1864)). Moreover, the Court's decision in
Worcester required no action whatsoever by the President or the executive branch and
therefore, would have required no response or reaction from him. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561-
62.
8. Jean Edward Smithnevertheless reports the legend as factinhis otherwise masterful
biography of the great Chief Justice. JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A
NATION 20 (1996). This legend is similarly reported as fact in Palmer's comparative study of
the legacies of Marshall and Taney. BEN W. PALMER, MARSHALLAND TANEY: STATESMEN OF
THE LAW 44 (1939).
9. For the falsity of these other legends, see SMITH, supra note 8, at 144-46, 346-47,394,
400, 500-01.
10. Jack M. Balkin, The Use That the Future Makes of the Past: John Marshall's
Greatness and its Lessons for Today's Supreme Court Justices, 43 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1321
(2002).
11. DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 599 (1995).
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manipulated throughout American history than on his actual deeds
and accomplishments.12 My purpose is both to trace Marshall's
shifting image(s) from the time of his death through the dawning of
the modern era and to test the criteria that Balkin has suggested
for measuring judicial greatness. The materials relevant to my
inquiry are not so much the Court's official opinions but the public
statements and sentiments of national political leaders, Supreme
Court justices, and others who have helped to shape public images
of Marshall over time.
This Article consists of six sections. The first five sections briefly
sketch John Marshall's image in different eras-the Jacksonian, the
Civil War and Reconstruction, the Progressive, the New Deal, and
the dramatic first few years of the Warren Court. The final section
considers some possible lessons that can be derived from this
survey regarding Marshall's place in our history, including some
relevant criteria for determining judicial greatness. The criteria,
which cut across ideological and partisan divisions, include: (1) the
longevity of service on the Court; (2) substantial participation in the
decisions in some of the Court's most socially and politically
significant opinions over time; (3) the basic qualities of a jurist's
decisions (including, but not limited to, their relative craftsmanship
particularly in terms of a distinctive writing style, creativity,
influence, and durability); (4) leadership on and off the Court
(including developing strong support from national political leaders
and academic elites over time); and (5) distinctive or exemplary
judicial temperament. For ajurist to qualify for greatness, he or she
should satisfy not some but all of these criteria. John Marshall
unquestionably meets all of them and thus easily qualifies as a
great justice.
I. THE JACKSONIAN ERA
It is tempting to think that in the few decades immediately
following John Marshall's death there was a distinct image of
Marshall that dominated the public consciousness. In fact, there
12. As used here, image refers to a "concept or impression, created in the minds of the
public, of a particular person." VII THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 666 (2d ed. 1989).
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was not. Instead, in the few decades immediately following his
death, there was more than one salient image of Marshall put
forward to the public, depending on the politics of the observers or
commentators.
Immediately following Marshall's death on July 9, 1835, there
was a notable outpouring of praise that crossed party lines. 3 One
eloquent eulogy came from President Jackson, who had led the
Democratic movement that had helped to bury Marshall's own
Federalist party some years before Marshall's death. In his eulogy,
President Jackson acknowledged that although
I sometimes dissented from the constitutional expositions of
John Marshall, I have always set a high value upon the good he
has done for his country. The judicial opinions of John Marshall
were expressed with the energy [and clarity,] which were
peculiar to his strong mind, and give him a rank among the
greatest men of his age.'4
Many prominent Whigs, including their leader Henry Clay, praised
Marshall, as did John Quincy Adams, by then a member of the
House of Representatives. 5 Throughout this period, a relentless
defender of the late Chief Justice's legacy both on and off the Court
was his friend and colleague Associate Justice Joseph Story. 6
At the same time, the partisanship that predominated discourse
regarding the Court during Marshall's tenure did not end with his
death. Indeed, it persisted, if not intensified. A number of
13. See 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 807-12
(rev. ed. 1926) (quoting and citing to various newspapers' eulogies and commentaries on
Marshall's death); G. EDWARD WHITE, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-1835, at 774 (abr. ed. 1991)
(noting an "outpouring of praise for" Marshall at the time of his death as well as "a revival
of charges of partisanship and political aggrandizement that had been reflected in earlier
critics").
14. Letter from Andrew Jackson to Horace Binney (Sept. 18, 1835) (on file with the
Jackson papers, Library of Congress).
15. See CARL BRENT SWISHER, HISTORY OFTHE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
THE TANEY PERIOD, 1836-1864, at 29 (1974) (quoting John Q. Adams' praise of Marshall for
having "cemented the Union which the crafty and quixotic democracy of Jefferson had a
perpetual tendency to dissolve") (citation omitted).
16. See, e.g., I LIFE AND LETTERS OFJOSEPH STORY 521-22 (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd.
2000) (William W. Story ed., 1851); Letter from Joseph Story to Richard Peters (July 24,
1835), in II id. at 200-02.
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Democratic newspapers expressed their satisfaction that Marshall's
death gave President Jackson a golden opportunity to appoint a
successor.17 In a series of partisan editorials on the significance of
Marshall's record, the New York Evening Post was perhaps the
most openly gloating of the Democratic papers. 8 It frankly labeled
Marshall a partisan, who, in its estimation,
distrusted the virtue and intelligence of the people, and was in
favor of a strong and vigorous General Government, at the
expense of the rights of the States and of the people. His judicial
decisions of all questions involving political principles have been
uniformly on the side of implied powers and a free construction
of the Constitution. 9
The paper denounced Marshall for having "been, all his life long, a
stumbling block and impediment in the way of democratick [sic]
principles ... , and his situation, therefore, at the head of an
important tribunal, constituted in utter defiance of the very first
principles of democracy, has always been to us ... an occasion of
lively regret."0 It concluded, "[tlhat he is at length removed from
that station is a source of satisfaction," and noting that while "we
lament the death of a good and exemplary man, we cannot grieve
that the cause of aristocracy has lost one of its chief supporters.""'
17. See ARTHURM. SCHLESINGER, JR.,THEAGE OFJACKSON 323 (1945); 1 WARREN, supra
note 13, at 807-12.
18. There were several other leading newspapers that published editorials on the
occasion of Marshall's death that condemned the constitutional doctrine he had helped to
create. One Ohio newspaper described his opinions as being "of the ultra-federal cast and
hav[ing] had a greater tendency to warp that great charter of our rights than the opinions
of any other man." 1 WARREN, supra note 13, at 811 (citation omitted). Another Ohio
newspaper commented that Marshall's decisions "have done more to consolidate this
government and destroy the rights of the States than all the wild legislation of Congress."
Id. (citation omitted). A South Carolina newspaper suggested that it was likely that"a great
majority of the American people" entertained different constitutional principles than had
Marshall. Id. at 812 (citation omitted). A North Carolina paper commented that Marshall
had "a spirit of hostility and inflexible opposition to Democracy," while a Maine newspaper
frankly admitted his death was "a source of satisfaction" because he remained in office
through the efforts of those "opposed in every way to Democratick [sic] principles." Id.
(citations omitted).
19. Id- at 807-08 (citation omitted).
20. Id. at 808 (citation omitted).
21. Id- at 807-08 (citation omitted).
20021 1403
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These comments sparked extremely sharp condemnation from
the Whig newspapers.22 For instance, the New York Courier
retorted, "[tihe brutality of the Evening Post is meeting bitter
rebuke from every quarter of the Union where its infamous notice
of the death of Chief Justice Marshall has reached.... [Its editorial
was] an atrocious outpouring of partisan venom."' The
Philadelphia National Gazette responded that the Evening Post's
editorials were "[an] endeavor to breathe the polluted breath of
party upon the spotless ermine. ... What has democracy in
federalism or any other party.appellation to do with the tribunal of
justice?"2' The Post responded that "democracy and federalism ...
have much to do with that tribunal of justice to which belongs the
expounding of Constitutional questions," and reiterated its view
that "in all ... questions, the decision of which rested wholly on the
construction to be given certain clauses of the Constitution, ...
Chief Justice Marshall threw the whole weight of his official
influence on the aristocratick [sic] side of free construction."'
To put these debates in broader perspective, one should recall
that' to Marshall's critics, his chief justiceship strengthened the
Court as a "fortress of conservatism." 26 Democrats, first under
Thomas Jefferson and later under Andrew Jackson, derided
Marshall as a conservative, because Marshall and his allies had
resisted the changes that Jacksonian democracy promised.
Marshall's detractors believed he had been instrumental in reading
into the Constitution the policies and philosophy of the Federalist
party long after it had ceased to exist." To its critics, the Federalist
party was the party of aristocracy (i.e., of those who had power and
owned property at and since the time of the Constitution's
founding),28 and so to these critics anything Marshall did to advance
his party's cause was construed as promoting aristocracy. As Chief
Justice, he joined in upholding broad exercises of federal power at
the expense of state sovereignty and in restricting state
22. See generally id. at 808-09.
23. Id. (citation omitted).
24. WHrr, supra note 13, at 775 (alteration in original).
25. Id. (citation omitted).
26. SCHLESINGER, supra note 17, at 322.
27. See id. at 16.
28. See generally id. at 9-17.
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interferences with contract and property rights.29 Whereas
Marshall's defenders hailed his opinions for ensuring the viability
of the newly formed national government, his critics condemned
him for expanding federal power at the expense of the states, for his
distrust of democratic institutions and populism, for thwarting
state economic and social reforms, and for protecting the privileges
and status of the propertied classes.o
The obviously sharp partisan differences between those who
supported Marshall's vision and those who denounced it were
intensified by President Jackson's choice of a successor, Roger
Taney. In many respects, Whigs viewed Taney as the antithesis of
Marshall. Those sympathetic to Marshall's vision feared that, as
one of Jackson's most loyal defenders, Taney would become an
integral part of a governmental regime basically opposed to many
of the principles for which Marshall stood. Whigs were especially
fearful that the Court, under Taney's guidance, would surrender its
guardianship of property rights, which it would leave to the mercy
of state legislatures dominated bythe masses. Whigs further feared
Taney, whose nominations for Treasury Secretary and Associate
Justice had been previously rejected by the Senate, would be eager
to use his powers as Chief Justice to even the score with his
political foes. In 1836, a shift in control of the Senate to the
Democrats virtually guaranteed Taney's confirmation.3 ' The Senate
ultimately confirmed Taney, but not before his nomination endured
sharp attacks from some Whig senators-particularly for actions he
had undertaken while serving as Acting Treasury Secretary to
undermine the national bank.32
29. See CARL BRENT SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY 350-51 (1935). As Professor Swisher
observed:
The popularity of John Marshall... and the prestige acquired by the Supreme
Court during his rdgime, resulted largely from the fact that he wrote into
constitutional law the beliefs and prejudices of a class, the class, incidentally,
from whose records and in terms ofwhose judgments most of the history of the
period has been written. Outside that class he and his court were anything but
popular ....
Id. at 350.
30. WHITE, supra note 13, at 777.
31. SWISHER, supra note 15, at 35-36 (detailing the "intricate political maneuvering"
involved in nominating Taney).
32. E.g., SAMUEL TYLER, MEMOIR OF ROGER BROOKE TANEY 249 (Da Capo Press 1970)
(1872) (recounting Henry Clay's hostility to Taney during the confirmation process).
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In sharp contrast to Marshall, Chief Justice Taney joined or
authored opinions that construed property rights as being less than
absolute,33 expanded state sovereignty to regulate economic matters
under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 4 and expanded the scope of
the police powers of localities and the states to act on behalf of the
general welfare. 5 If Marshall had been advancing conservatism,
Taney and other like-minded jurists were viewed (and even thought
of themselves), as one supportive paper observed, "of the most
liberal cast."3" Democrats such as Taney viewed themselves as the
rightful heirs to the political revolution begun by Thomas
Jefferson;"1 they favored greater state sovereignty generally as well
as particularly to reform bankruptcy and commercial laws for the
sake of redressing social inequities and discontent that Democrats
believed Marshall had helped to foster through his Court's
extensive protections of private contract and property rights,
limitations on the states' dormant commerce power, and restricted
conception of state police power.
Near the end of his tenure, Chief Justice Taney clashed with
President Lincoln over the legitimacy of Lincoln's unilateral
suspension of habeas corpus. Sitting as a circuit judge, Chief
Justice Taney declared Lincoln's actions invalid."3 Chief Justice
33. E.g., Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11
Pet.) 420, 544 (1837) ( A]ny ambiguity in the terms of the contract, must operate against the
adventurers, and in favour of the public .... ").
34. E.g., The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847); New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11
Pet.) 102 (1837).
35. As Chief Justice, Marshall, in several opinions, asserted the traditional view of the
"police power," under which the terms were used to distinguish the functions of the state
government from the functions of the federal government. Chief Justice Taney described the
"police power" as "nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every
sovereignty to the extent of its dominions," that is, "the power to govern men and things."
Thurow v. Massachusetts, 46 U.S. (6 How.) 504, 583 (1847).
36. SWISHER, supra note 29, at 323 (citation omitted).
37. In two terms as President, Jackson appointed six justices to the Court. See generally
HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF SUPREME COURT
APPOINTMENTS FROMWASHINGTONTO CLINTON 72-78 (rev. 3d ed. 1999) (discussing Jackson's
appointments of Justices McLean, Baldwin, Wayne, Taney, Barbour, and Catron).
38. See Ex Parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487). Lincoln ignored
Taney's order, but the public reaction was such that the President, in his message to
Congress of July 4, 1861, asked for specific authorization to suspend the writ. Congress
complied almost instantly. On September 24,1862, Lincoln acted, providing for the military
trial of "all Rebels and Insurgents, their aiders and abettors within the United States, and
all persons discouraging volunteer enlistments, resisting militia drafts, or guilty of any
1406
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Taney believed the lawlessness of Lincoln's actions posed a graver
threat to the Constitution and the Republic than the brewing
southern rebellion. Taney believed that it was not worth pre-
serving the Union at the price Lincoln was exacting; it would have
meant sacrificing the very aspects of the federal system-those that
protected the state sovereignty essential for progressive lawmaking
-that Taney believed were its saving graces.39
It is, however, a mistake to read too much into the sharp
ideological differences between Marshall and Taney. To be sure, the
rise of Jacksonian democracy, coupled with the collapse and
extinction of the Federalist party, left both Marshall and his
intellectual ally Joseph Story despondent. Immediately after
Andrew Jackson's election to the presidency in 1828, both Marshall
and Story could envision only disaster; they believed Jackson's
election promised "[tihe reign of King 'Mob.'"'4 Yet, Jackson's
staunch opposition to nullification seems to have led both Marshall
and Story to have modified their perceptions of Jackson and to have
declared themselves as his "warmest supporters ... as long as he
maintains the principles contained in [his statements on
nullification]."4 ' Moreover, Marshall and Taney were friendly
disloyal practice, affording comfort to the Rebels against the authority of the United States."
Abraham Lincoln, Proclamation Suspending the Writ of Habeas Corpus (Sept. 24, 1862), in
4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 437 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953); see also Ex
parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wan.) 243 (1863) (holding the Supreme Court does not have
power to review proceedings of a military commission); cf Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
2 (1866) (holding military commission's conviction of a civilian invalid). See generally
WILLIAMi H. REHNQmsT, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME (1998)
(examining the clash between needs of a successful war effort and the need to protect civil
liberties).
39. SWISHER, supra note 15, at 556 (asserting that Taney "felt so differently ... as to
prefer the death of the Union to the medicine which the President prescribed as necessary
to save it"); Carl Brent Swisher, Mr. Chief Justice Taney, in MR. JUSTICE 223-24 (Allison
Dunham & Philip B. Kurland eds., 1956) (discussing the Merryman case and Taney's views
on the Union's foundations).
40. SCHLESINGER, supra note 17, at 6 (citation omitted). Time did not necessarily
alleviate these fears, as Story declared in an 1835 interview that Marshallwas of the opinion
that "everything is sinking down into despotism, under the disguise of a democratic
government." WARREN, supra note 13, at 796 (citation omitted). Marshall echoes these
sentiments elsewhere. For instance, in 1828 he wrote Story that the impending presidential
election had prompted him to "begin to fear that our Constitution is not doomed to be so long
lived as its real friends have hoped." SMTH, supra note 8, at 500 (citation omitted).
41. SMITH, supra note 8, at 519-20 (citation omitted).
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acquaintances, in spite of their political differences.42 Almost
certainly with Taney's knowledge, Marshall had written to
Benjamin Watkins Leigh, a senator from Virginia, in support of
Taney's ill-fated nomination as an Associate Justice.43 For his part,
Taney seems to have reciprocated in subtle if not arguably
imperceptible ways. As Chief Justice, Taney maintained a stony
silence about Marshall outside of the pages of the official reports of
the Court. Moreover, Taney's chief justiceship not only failed to
produce the constitutional revolution most ardent Democrats had
desired but actually, to their everlasting regret, expanded federal
authority on several notable occasions." Yet nothing Taney did
enhanced Marshall's image more than the manner in which Taney
ended his chief justiceship. After his disastrous opinion in Dred
Scott v. Sandford,45 Taney's reputation never recovered, and though
he remained on the Court for almost another decade his most
eminent biographer concedes Taney "died in virtual public
disgrace."46 Taney's willingness to stake the Court's and his own
reputations on the Court's ability to settle the sectional divisions
over slavery ensured that forever after he would pale in any
subsequent public comparison with Marshall. None of Marshall's
opinions, however mistaken they might have been, could compare
with the tragic dimensions of and fallout from Dred Scott.
II. THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION
During the period extending from the beginning of the Civil War
through the end of Reconstruction, John Marshall was not as
notable or revered a public figure as many might assume. Neither
Lincoln nor any of the six justices whom he appointed tended to
defer to Marshall as their model in dealing with the great
constitutional issues of their day. Even though Marshall's
intellectual ally, Justice Story, proudly declared to Henry Clay in
42. SWISHER, supra note 29, at 313.
43. See TYLER, supra note 32, at 240-41.
44. See CURRIE, supra note 6, at 277 (asserting that Taney had presided over "a striking
expansion of federal judicial authority beyond the boundaries set by the Marshall Court").
45. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
46. SWISHER, supra note 29, at 586. Another illustration of Taney's ignominy is the
congressional dispute, subsequent to his death, over funding of a bust of Taney for the
Supreme Court chambers. See id. at 971-72.
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1838, "I am a Whig,"' 7 both Lincoln-who began his political career
as a Whig-and the justices whom he appointed tended not to view
themselves as the intellectual heirs of either Marshall or Story.
At least three developments might explain why Marshall was not
a highly revered figure in the political discourse in this period. The
first was the series of Supreme Court opinions that favored slave
owners. One of the first of these decisions, Prigg v. Pennsylvania,48
was written by none other than Marshall's acolyte, Joseph Story.
The Court upheld the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act of
1793,"' ruling that the Fugitive-Slave Clause of Article IV was self-
executing and therefore authorized a slave owner to use self-help in
capturing a fugitive slave.50 The second decision was the most tragic
of any made by the Court up until that time (and since)-Dred Scott
v. Sandford-in which a majority ruled both that African-
Americans could never become citizens of the United States and
that slaves were property in whom their owners had virtually
absolute rights to do as they pleased free from the federal
government's interference. It could not have helped Marshall's
image that he was cited as an authority in support of the rulings in
both Prigg1 and Dred Scott.52 Nor could it have helped that
Marshall had been instrumental in fashioning some of the Court's
earliest and most fundamental decisions protectingprivate property
rights. Thus, many radical Republicans, interested in constitutional
change, were not likely to view Marshall with unquestioning
reverence; to them, he was, inter alia, a source of some of the
constitutional difficulties they were confronting. At the same time,
many Democrats viewed Marshall as the embodiment of the
constitutional philosophy they opposed and hoped Taneywould help
to overthrow. Hence, neither party's leaders-were disposed to turn
to Marshall's image to help their cause.
47. SCHLESINGER, supra note 17, at 323.
48. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
49. Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. VIII, 1 Stat. 302.
50. Prigg, 41 U.S. at 626.
51. Id. at 622 (citing Sturgis v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819)).
52. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,501 (1857) (Campbell, J., concurring)
(citing Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823)); id. at 502 (citing Fletcher v.
Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810)); id. at 510 (citing 2 JOHN MARSHALL, THE LIFE OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON 75-76 (1804)).
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The second development is that the Dred Scott decision cemented
Lincoln's disenchantment with the Supreme Court. The more time
Lincoln spent pondering the decision, the less he liked it.
Eventually, as Lincoln's biographer David Herbert Donald suggests,
"[s]o blatant was the Chief Justice's misreading of the law, so gross
was his distortion of the documents fundamental to American
liberty, that Lincoln's faith in an impartial, rational judiciary was
shaken; never again did he give deference to the rulings of the
Supreme Court."" After Dred Scott, Lincoln sharpened his unique
constitutional vision that purported to read the Constitution in
light of the Declaration of Independence. In Lincoln's vision, the
Declaration of Independence, for the first time in the nation's
history, became a legitimate source of constitutional meaning."M
Third, Lincoln, Republican leaders in Congress, and the Cabinet
(including Lincoln's first Treasury Secretary and future Supreme
Court Chief Justice Salmon Chase) increasingly saw themselves in
the 1860s as trying to reinvent-indeed, to reconstruct-both the
country and the Constitution."5 The Union's victory in the Civil War
helped to transform the United States, for the first time, into a
genuine nation,56 rather than a loose confederation of states. To fit
this new reality, the original Constitution, with which Marshall was
so closely identified, had to be overhauled.57 Lincoln readily agreed
with the necessity for the overhaul, but he would not live to lead the
Republic through it.
In the debates over Reconstruction that followed Lincoln's
assassination, at least two images of Marshall were notable.
Perhaps the most popular image of Marshall that emerged in these
53. DONALD, supra note 11, at 201.
54. See generally GEORGE P. FLETCHER, OUR SECRET CONSTITUTION: How LINCOLN
REDEFINED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2001).
55. Interestingly, in none of the major biographies of Lincoln and Chase is any mention
made of public statements by either regarding Marshall. Nor do any of the classic or best-
known works on Reconstruction include any references to or reliance on Marshall within the
congressional debate on Reconstruction. While I hesitate to infer anything conclusive from
these omissions, they raise the possible inference that Marshall did not occupy a prominent
place in either Lincoln's or Chase's thinking about how to resolve the great constitutional
issues of their day.
56. See generally FLETCHER, supra note 54.
57. For overviews, see 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998);
FLETCHER, supra note 54; ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 (1988).
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debates was as the author of the 1833 opinion in Barron v. Mayor
of Baltimore,58 in which the Court held that the Bill of Rights did
not apply to the states. For some of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Framers (such as Congressman John Bingham), this vision was
anachronistic and became a central target of Reconstruction. 59 Even
before Reconstruction, some abolitionist lawyers-including future
Chief Justice Chase-rejected Marshall's narrow reading of the
applicability of the Bill of Rights and defended a contrary reading
that would have made them applicable to the states.6" The other
significant image of Marshall from this period is reflected in the
Fourteenth Amendment by means of its adoption of Marshall's
conception of the source of national power as set forth in McCulloch
v. Maryland,6 1 namely, that the federal government derived its
ultimate authority not from the states but rather from the people
of the United States.
President Lincoln's assassination helped to deprive the debates
over Reconstruction of any clear leadership. Though Reconstruction
produced several civil rights statutes and three new constitutional
amendments, its promise was short-lived. By 1877, Reconstruction
was effectively over; 2 Marshall's image lay dormant outside of the
pages of the official reports of the Court until the beginning of the
twentieth century, when it would assume unparalleled vitality in
the wake of both the centennial of Marshall's appointment as Chief
Justice and the fallout from another presidential assassination.
58. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
59. Cf AKHILREEDAMAR, THE BILLOFRIGHTS: CREATIONAND RECONSTRUCTION 140-62,
164-65 (1998) (surveying the arguments in the Reconstruction Congress for and against
Marshall's construction of the Constitution in Barron and explaining the "increasing[]
plausiblility] to think the Constitution should be amended to overrule Barron"); MICHAEL
KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF
RIGHTS 22-25 (1986) (describing how Burron "promoted the stability of the Union at the
expense of liberty" and required fixing by constitutional amendment).
60. AMRA, supra note 59, at 161-62.
61. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
62. See generally FONER, supra note 57; MichaelJ. Gerhardt, Ackermania: The Quest for
a Common Law of Higher Lawmaking, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1731 (1999) (reviewing 2
ACKERMAN, supra note 57).
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III. THE PROGRESSIVE ERA
The conventional wisdom regarding Marshall's image during the
Progressive era is that it took a beating.63 In fact, the conventional
wisdom is wrong. To the contrary, it was an era in which there was
widespread bipartisan recognition of Marshall's contributions to our
constitutional understanding and nationhood, with some notable
dissents.
For Marshall, 1901 proved to be a pivotal year, because it marked
the centennial of his appointment as Chief Justice. This event
helped to initiate a renaissance of Marshall's public image. Indeed,
the centennial began dramatically with an unprecedented
occasion-the first and only time that a Chief Justice addressed a
joint session of Congress. Prior to the Chief Justice's address,
Congress passed a concurrent resolution suggested by President
William McKinley that marked February 4,1901, as a"celebrat [ion]
throughout the United States as the one hundredth anniversary of
the assumption by John Marshall of the office of the Chief Justice
of the United States."64
After the resolution had been passed and read, Chief Justice
Melville W. Fuller addressed both houses of Congress, the
President, the Cabinet, and the other members of the Supreme
Court. Fuller was a Democrat who had been appointed to the office
by Grover Cleveland. He had helped to provoke public controversy
by overseeing a Court that had been the first to recognize the
doctrine of economic due process, which provided for vigorous
judicial scrutiny-under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments-of
legislation that interfered with private property or economic
interests.65
The focus of Fuller's remarks was Marshall's contributions to the
formation and legitimacy of judicial review. According to Fuller,
Marshall's exercise of judicial review helped to formulate "legal
rules of construction [whose] application is to be found the basis of
the National fabric; the seed of the National growth; [and] the
63. See Jean Edward Smith, Marshall Misconstrued: Activist? Partisan? Reactionary?,
33 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 1109, 1112-22 (2000).
64. Appendix, Centennial of Chief Justice Marshall's Appointment, 180 U.S. 643 (1901).
65. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578
(1897).
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vindication of a written form of Government."6 Fuller explained
that in achieving these extraordinary results through his exercise
of judicial review, Marshall faced formidable obstacles, including
"heated partisan controversy" over proper division of power between
the federal and state sovereignties." Fuller observed:
To hold the balance true between these jarring poles; to tread
the straight and narrow path marked out by law, regardless of
political expediency and party politics on the one hand, and of
jealousies of the revising power on the other; to reason out the
governing principles in such manner as to leave the mind free
to pursue its own course without perplexity, and to commend
the conclusions reached to the sober second thought; these
demanded that breadth of view; that power of generalization;
that clearness of expression; that unerring discretion; that
simplicity and strength of character; that indomitable fortitude;
which, combined in Marshall, enabled him to disclose the
workinglines of that great Republic, whose foundations the men
of the Revolution laid in the principles of liberty and self-
government, lifting up their hearts in the aspiration that they
might never be disturbed, and looking to that future when its
lofty towers would rise "into the midst of sailing birds and silent
air. "11
Fuller concluded with a recognition of Marshall's unique
achievement in overcoming the "antagonisms" in the
"administration of the law." 9 Fuller declared:
And so the great Chief Justice, reconciling "the jealousy of
freedom with the independence of the judiciary," for a third of
a century, pursued his stately way, establishing, in the
accomplishment of the work given him to do, those sure and
solid principles of government on which our constitutional
system rests.
The Nation has entered into his labors, and may well bear
witness, as it does today, to the immortality of the fame of this
66. Appendix, Centennial of Chief Justice Marshall's Appointment, 180 U.S. at 648
(Remarks of C.J. Fuller).
67. Id.
68. Id. (citation omitted in original).
69. Id. at 648-49.
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"sweet and virtuous soul," whose powers were so admirable and
the results of their exercise of such transcendent consequence.70
On that same day in Richmond, Virginia, Associate Justice
Horace Gray spoke about the life, character, and influence of
Marshall.71 In some detail, Justice Gray reviewed Marshall's
comments about his early life in his autobiographical letter
written to Justice Story, contemporaneous observations about
Marshall's demeanor on the bench, extrajudicial writings on the law
by Marshall and Story, choice language from Marshall's most
significant opinions, and commentaries on Marshall's greatness
from notable authorities, such as Justice Joseph Bradley.72 In the
latter portion of his remarks, Justice Gray explained why his
"service of nearly twenty years on the bench of the Supreme Court
has confirmed me in th[e] estimate" of Marshall as "[t]he greatest
judge in the language.' 73 After quoting the eminent Supreme Court
advocate Edward Phelps's evaluation of Marshall's greatness,74
Justice Gray observed, "None other of the great judges of England
or of America ever had the great opportunity that fell to the lot of
Marshall.... [I]t is his intellect and his character, that have a
lasting influence on mankind."75
On that same day in Boston,76 several notable speakers marked
the occasion. Principal among them, Oliver Wendell Holmes, then
a judge on Massachusetts' highest court, addressed the greatness
of Chief Justice Marshall. In his remarks, Holmes initially
complained of the difficulty of assessing a person's significance
apart from the period in which he lived:
A great man represents a great ganglion in the nerves of society,
or, to vary the figure, a strategic point in the campaign of
history, and part of [Marshall's] greatness consists in his being
70. Id. at 649 (citation omitted in original).
71. Id. at 677 (Address of J. Gray).
72. Id. at 700.
73. Id. at 703.
74. Id. at 703 ("The test of historical greatness-the sort of greatness that becomes
important in future history-is not great ability merely. It is a great ability, combined with
great opportunity, greatly employed.) (citation omitted in original).
75. Id. at 703, 712.
76. For another important speech on the occasion of the centennial of Marshall's
appointment as Chief Justice, see J.B. Moore, John Marshall, 16 POL. Sci. Q. 393 (1901).
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there. I no more can separate John Marshall from the fortunate
circumstance that the appointment of Chief Justice fell to John
Adams, instead of to Jefferson a month later, and so gave it to
a Federalist and loose constructionist to start the working of the
Constitution ....7
He candidly expressed his doubt whether
after Hamilton and the Constitution itself, Marshall's work
proved more than a strong intellect, a good style, personal
ascendancy in his court, courage, justice and the convictions of
his party... If I were to think of John Marshall simply by
number and measure in the abstract, I might hesitate in my
superlatives.78
Moreover, Holmes explained,"The men whom I should be tempted
to commemorate would be the originators of transforming thought.
They often are half obscure, because what the world pays for is
judgment, not the original mind."79 Nevertheless, he acknowledged
at the end of his remarks:
Not only do I recur to what I said in the beginning, and
remembering that you cannot separate a man from his place,
remember also that there fell to Marshall perhaps the greatest
place that ever was filled by a judge; but when I consider his
might, his justice, and his wisdom, I do fully believe that if
American law were to be represented by a single figure, sceptic
[sic] and worshipper alike would agree without dispute that the
figure could be one alone, and that one John Marshall.80
Following Holmes, the nation's most eminent constitutional
scholar, James Bradley Thayer of Harvard Law School, spoke at
length about Marshall's life and accomplishments. Later in the
year, he expanded his remarks into a book-length biography of
Marshall."' Although Thayer had by then made a name for himself
as the principal academic proponent of judicial self-restraint, he
77. THE HOLMES READER 78-79 (Julius J. Mark ed., 2d ed. 1964).
78. Id. at 78, 79.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL (1974).
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offered only mild criticisms of Marshall. He suggested that neither
Marbury v. Madison 2 nor Dartmouth College v. Woodward'3
deserved the great praise they often received: "The very common
view [of them] is partly attributable to the fallacy which
Wordsworth once remarked upon when a friend mentioned 'The
Happy Warrior' as being the greatest of his poems. 'No,' said the
poet, 'you are mistaken; your judgment is affected by your moral
approval of the lines."" Moreover, in Marbury,
there are grave and far-reaching considerations ... which are
not touched on by Marshall, and which must have commanded
his attention if the subject had been deeply considered and fully
expounded according to his later method. His reasoning does not
answer the difficulties that troubled [m]any... strong, learned
and thoughtful men, not to mention Jefferson's familiar and
often ill-digested objections. It assumes as an essential feature
of a written constitution which does not exist in any one of the
written constitutions of Europe. It does not remark the grave
distinction between the power of disregarding the coordinate
department, and the action of a federal court in dealing with the
legislation of the local States .... 85
In spite of these shortcomings and the fact that Marshall "erred
sometimes, from interpreting too literally and too narrowly the
restraints upon the States," 6 Thayer concluded that Marshall's
most enduring contribution to the nation's welfare lay in "planting
the national government on the broadest and strongest foun-
dations."" Marshall accomplished this achievement through his
"strong constitutional doctrine, explained in detail, elaborated,
powerfully argued, over and over again, with unsurpassable
earnestness and force, placed permanently in our judicial records,
holding its own during the long emergence of a feebler political
82. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
83. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
84. THAYER, supra note 81, at 84.
85. Id. at 97-98.
86. Id. at 89.
87. Id. at 90.
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theory, and showing itself in all its majesty when war and civil
dissension came."5 8
By the end of the next year, Holmes's ambivalence about
Marshall came back to haunt him by threatening his own appoint-
ment to the Supreme Court. At the time Justice Gray spoke about
Marshall in 1901, President McKinley was already aware of the
possibility of Gray's retirement, and planned to nominate Alfred
Hemenway, a prominent Boston attorney, to Gray's seat once Gray
formally announced his retirement.89 Before Gray announced his
retirement, President McKinley was shot and killed in September
1901.90 It was not until a year later that Gray officially announced
his intention to resign, at which time the new President was
Theodore Roosevelt.91 Roosevelt did not feel bound to follow
McKinley's preferences in filling the seat. He was more interested
in nominating the venerable Massachusetts justice Holmes, whom
he knew personally. Yet, he had qualms about appointing Holmes
to the Court because of the views Holmes had expressed about John
Marshall.92
President Roosevelt considered John Marshall as the model of
the kind of Supreme Court justice he wanted to appoint. Marshall
was one of Roosevelt's heroes. As Roosevelt once explained,
Marshall "is distinctly among the greatest of the great, and no
man, save Washington and Lincoln, alone, deserves heartier
homage from us.'"93 Marshall's greatness, "like that of Washington
and Lincoln, consisted in his acceptance of the duties of 'a
statesman of the national type.'"'" In Roosevelt's view, the
counterexample was Marshall's successor, Roger Taney, who "'was
88. Id. at 58-59. Six years earlier, Thayer had singled out Marshall as one of a handful
of American judges who were
sensible of the true nature of their work and of the large method of treatment
which it required, who perceived that our constitutions had made them, in a
limited and secondary way, but yet a real one, coadjutors with the other
departments in the business of government; but many have fallen short of the
requirements of so great a function.
I JAMES BRADLEY, THAYER, CASES ON CONSTrruTiONAL LAW, at v-vi (1895).
89. ABRAHAM, supra note 37, at 118.
90. Id-
91. Id.
92. Id. at 119.
93. H.W. BRANDS, T.R.: THE LAST ROMANTIC 440 (1997) (no citation in original).
94. Id. (no citation in original).
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a curse to our national life because he belonged to the wrong party
and faithfully carried out the criminal and foolish views of the party
which stood for such a construction of the Constitution as would
have rendered it impossible even to preserve the national life." 95
President Roosevelt wanted to appoint someone who would be, like
Marshall,
a party man, a constructive statesman, constantly keeping in
mind his adherence to the principles and policies under which
this nation has been built up and in accordance with which it
must goes [sic] on; and keeping in mind also his relations with
his fellow statesmen who in other branches of the government
are striving in cooperation with him to advance the ends of
government.96
Roosevelt inferred from Holmes's questioning of Marshall's
greatness the possibility that Holmes was not as committed as
Roosevelt would like for him to have been to his party's principles.
Roosevelt explained to his friend and political patron Senator Henry
Cabot Lodge: "'It may seem to be but it is not really, a small matter
that his speech on Marshall should be unworthy of the subject, and
above all should show a total incapacity to grasp what Marshall
did."97 Roosevelt confessed that to be more comfortable with
nominating Holmes, "'I should like to know that Judge Holmes was
in entire sympathy with our views." s Roosevelt appreciated that
Justice Gray had strongly supported progressive governmental
action, and recognized he would be "'guilty of an irreparable wrong
to the nation if [he] should put in [Gray's] place any man who was
not absolutely sane and sound on the great national policies for
which [they] stand in public life.'"99 In other words, Roosevelt
wanted someone who, like Marshall, would be committed to the
principles of the Republican party as Roosevelt understood them
long after Roosevelt left office. Though Roosevelt eventually
95. Id. (no citation in original).
96. Id. (no citation in original).
97. Id. at 441 (no citation in original).
98. Id. (no citation in original).
99. Id. (no citation in original).
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satisfied his doubts about Holmes, he lost confidence in Holines's
commitment to these principles not long after the appointment. 100
In spite of the differences in Roosevelt's constitutional philosophy
from those of the next two presidents, both of them shared his
reverence for Marshall. As President, Roosevelt had steadfastly
opposed judicial obstruction of progressive economic reforms for the
sake of protecting private property rights and construed his own
authority as extending to anything that the Constitution did not
expressly prohibit; however, his hand-picked successor, William
Howard Taft, as President and later Chief Justice, vigorously
defended aggressive judicial protection of private property rights,
opposed economic redistribution, and construed his presidential
authority as expressly limited to the powers given to him.
Nevertheless, Taft biographer Alpheus T. Mason suggests that Taft
"respected no[ one] more than Marshall."01 When asked once
whether he would have preferred to have been president or John
Marshall, Taft did not hesitate to say, "I would rather have been
Marshall than any other American unless it had been Washington,
and I am inclined to think I would rather have been Marshall than
Washington. He made this country .... Marshall is certainly the
greatest jurist America has ever produced and Hamilton our
greatest constructive statesman."' 2 Given these sentiments, it
should not be surprising that Taft often followed Marshall's
reasoning in his opinions as Chief Justice. 103
Taft's successor as president, Woodrow Wilson, favored a "liberal"
interpretation of the Constitution that would have permitted
greater social and economic reform legislation, but, like Roosevelt
and Taft, greatly admired Marshall. Indeed, Wilson's admiration
was longstanding, dating at least as far back as his days as a
Princeton politics professor. In his famous treatise on the
Constitution, Wilson suggested:
By common consent the most notable and one of the most
statesmanlike figures in our whole judicial history is the figure
of John Marshall. No other name is comparable with his in fame
100. See id. at 542.
101. ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, Wi.IAM HOWARD TAFr, CHIEF JUSTICE 259 (1965).
102. Id at 260 (citation omitted).
103. See generally id. at 260-61.
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or honor in this singular field of statesmanlike judicial
control-a field of our own marking out and creation, a
statesmanship peculiar to our own annals. Marshall maybe said
to have created for us the principles of interpretation which
have governed our national development. He created them like
a great lawyer, master of the fundamental conceptions which
have enlightened all great lawyers in the administration of law
and have made it seem in their hands a system of life, not a
mere body of technical rules; he created them also like a great
statesman who sees his way as clearly without precedent as
with it to those renderings of charter and statute which will
vivify their spirit and enlarge their letter without straining a
single tissue of the vital stuff of which they are made."°4
Wilson found wanting the legitimacy of President Jackson's efforts
to resist following Marshall's dictates on the meaning of the
Constitution:
The two men were at the antipodes from one another both in
principle and character; had no common insight into the
institutions of the country which they served; represented one
the statesmanship of will and the other the statesmanship of
control.... [Jackson] was the sort of man who might very easily
twist and destroy our whole constitutional system, were the
courts robbed of their authority and the great balance-wheel of
their power shaken from its gearings.3
Wilson concluded with a remarkably strong defense of Marshall's
approach to constitutional interpretation:
[Olur courts have stood the test, chiefly because John Marshall
presided over their processes during the formative period of our
national life. He was of the school and temper of Washington.
He read constitutions in search of their spirit and purpose and
understood them in the light of conceptions under the influence
of which they were framed. He saw in them not mere negations
of power, but grants of power, and he reasoned from out the
large political experience of the race as to what those grants
104. WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 158-59
(Gaunt 1997) (1907).
105. Id. at 160.
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meant, what they were intended to accomplish, not as a pedant
but as a statesman, rather; and every generation of statesmen
since his day have recognized the fact that it was he more than
the men in Congress or in the President's chair who gave to our
federal government its scope and power. The greatest statesmen
are always those who attempt their tasks with imagination,
with a large vision of things to come, but with the conscience of
the lawyer, also, the knowledge that law must be built, not
wrested, to their use and purpose."
Besides Wilson, a number of notable scholars expressed their
opinions about Marshall's performance on the bench throughout the
Progressive era. One of the most eminent early legal scholars of the
era, Roscoe Pound, suggested that American judges' failures in his
lifetime to respond to modern economic and social developments
compared unfavorably to "'Lord Mansfield's development of mer-
cantile law by judicial decision ... Kent's working out of equity for
America from a handful of English decisions, [and] Marshall's work
in giving us a living constitution by judicial interpretation."'1 °7
Heavily influenced in his'thinking about the law by Pound, Justice
Benjamin Cardozo similarly paid homage to Marshall. In 1925, he
classified judicial opinions into different styles, of which he most
admired the magisterial style, "which eschewed analogy or illus-
tration and spoke from on high," and with which he closely
identified Marshall."0 8
The Progressive era did, however, feature some dissenters from
the positive images of Marshall otherwise put forward during the
period. Two leading academic commentators, Edwin Corwin at
Princeton and Benjamin Wright at Harvard, were among Marshall's
leading critics. Corwin argued that Marshall was a poor lawyer,
who exhibited his lack of understanding of the law of treason in
presiding over Burr's trial and who was motivated as Chief Justice
largely by his partisanship and contempt for Jefferson. 109 According
to Corwin, Marshall had "unstudious habits" and as a judge and
106. Id. at 168.
107. ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOzO 203 (1998) (quoting Roscoe Pound, Mechanical
Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 614-15 (1908) (alteration in original)).
108. Id. at 447.
109. EDWARD S. CORWIN, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE CONSTITUTION: A CHRONIcLE OF THE
SUPREME COURT (United States Publishers Ass'n 1977) (1919).
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attorney "preferred the quest of broad, underlying principles ...
with plenty of time for recuperation from each exertion."10 Wright
similarly tried to demonstrate that partisanship motivated
Marshall's opinions."' Though harsh, these criticisms did not
damage Marshall's image, for they were made at a time when the
New Deal was gaining increasing popular and judicial acceptance.
With these gains, Marshall's image would assume even greater
prominence and complexity.
IV. THE NEW DEAL ERA
In the course of setting forth his unique theory of constitutional
change, Bruce Ackerman criticizes the "conventional account" of the
New Deal." 2 In his view, this account is predicated on how the
Supreme Court attempted to reconcile its final acceptance of the
constitutional foundations of the New Deal with the original
conceptions of the scope of the Commerce Clause as set forth by
John Marshall. Believing such reconciliation was possible without
amending the Constitution is, in Ackerman's opinion, to accept "the
myth of rediscovery"" 3 and overlook that the reconciliation was
impossible and that instead there was a"constitutional moment,""'
in which the American people in conjunction with their leaders
agreed to make a permanent change in the Constitution without
going through the formal amendment process set forth in Article V
of the Constitution.
110. Id. at 42.
111. See WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 28-34.
112. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 57, at 259. For references to and illustrations of the
conventional account from the era, see SAMUEL HENDEL, CHARLEs EVANS HUGHES AND THE
SUPREME COURT 46 (1968) ("The basic doctrines upon which the Court built, and sometimes
altered, were those laid down by Chief Justice Marshall."); WILLIAM LEUCHTENBERG, THE
SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 231
(1995) (quoting columnist Raymond Clapper's notation in his diary on the day of the
supposed Switch in Time that "[these decisions go back to John Marshall's conception of
nationalism. They [are] not in line with recent decision but are in line with earlier
decisions.") (citation omitted) (second alteration in original); Louis B. Boudin, John Marshall
and Roger B. Taney, 24 GEO. L.J. 864 (1936); Robert B. Tunstall, John Marshall: One
Hundred Years After, 21 A.B.A. J. 561 (1935).
113. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 57, at 259.
114. Id. at 248, 259. For a critique of Ackerman's theory of constitutional change, see
Gerhardt, supra note 62, passim.
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The notion of a "myth of rediscovery," whether purposefully
designed or the product of ignorance, is mistaken for at least two
reasons. First, the rediscovery of Marshall had occurred at least a
few decades before the occurrence of the events that the
conventional account of the New Deal purports to explain." 5
Second, the justices who supported the New Deal (and the apparent
constitutional changes that made its legitimacy possible) had a
more complex and less uniform view of Marshall than the
conventional account seems to suggest. In fact, these justices did
not uniformly revere Marshall or consider him immune to criticism.
I focus on only three of the latter justices to reflect the diversity,
complexity, and lack of uniformity of their thought regarding John
Marshall. For instance, Charles Evans Hughes116 and Hugo Black
each had a life-long reverence for Marshall, and each expressed
regard for particular aspects of Marshall's constitutional
jurisprudence before either had occasion to claim its authorization
for his particular construction of the Commerce Clause." 7 Thus, it
115. See supra notes 63-111 and accompanying text.
116. Comparisonswere made betweenHughes and Marshall throughout the era in obvious
efforts to elevate Hughes' status. See, e.g., 2 MERLO J. PUSsY, CHARLES EVANs HUGHES 790
(1963) (quoting Attorney General Robert Jackson's statement that, "[t]he bar ranks Chief
Justice Hughes ina class with John Marshall"); Francis Biddle,Foreword, 41 COLUM. L. REV.
1157 (1941) ("To seek the equal of Hughes among the Chief Justices, the mind turns back to
Marshall and Taney, and dwells longer on Marshall as his true predecessor."); Robert H.
Jackson, The Judicial Career of ChiefJustice Hughes, 27 A.B.A. J. 408,410 (1941) ("Hughes'
vigorous championship of federal power under the commerce clause is reminiscent of
Marshall."); SPRINGFIELDREPUBLICAN, Feb. 16,1930 (quotingprominent New York attorney
Samuel Untermeyer as suggesting, "not since the appointment of Chief Justice Marshall has
a man of such outstanding ability, experience and judicial temperament been called to that
exalted office").
117. See PUSEY, supra note 116, at 692. Pusey quotes Hughes' 1932 address to a Fourth
Circuit judicial conference in which Hughes frankly acknowledged that the exercise of
judicial review
demands opportunities for experimentation and progress. We must ever keep
before our minds the illuminating phrase of Marshall, "that it is a constitution
we are expounding." That Constitution was made, as Justice Matthews
observed, "for an undefined and expanding future, and for a people gathered
and to be gathered from many nations and of many tongues."
Id. (citation omitted in original); see also ROGERK. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACKz ABIOGRAPHY 212
(2d ed. 1997) (quoting then-Senator Black's radio address defending Roosevelt's Court-
packing plan in part on the ground that "[a] 'bare majority' of the Court" had been
disregarding the original understanding of the Commerce Clause first announced by John
Marshall that allowed Congress to regulate 'those internal concerns which affect the States
generally'") (citation omitted in original).
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is not fair to assume that either's admiration for Marshall's
contributions to constitutional jurisprudence surfaced or began only
at pivotal moments of the supposed 1937 revolution.
Harlan Fiske Stone's attitude about Marshall was more complex.
While he suggestively named his son "Marshall," he was hardly
inclined to allow any reverence for Marshall to lead him to imbue
John Marshall with mythical qualities. To the contrary, Stone never
hesitated to recognize the limits of Marshall's reasoning on
experience. For instance, in 1937 then-Associate Justice Stone
dismissed Marshall's approach to the subject of governmental
immunities from taxation as overly simplistic:
I have always felt that everything needful would have been
accomplished had Marshall merely declared that neither
government can adopt a tax which discriminates against the
other, and that in the absence of discrimination either
government is free to lay such taxes as it pleases regardless of
its effect upon the other. The result would be that each
government, like everyone else, would have to pay its way
without special favors from the other. But to Chief Justice
Marshall everything was black and white."8
When it came to dealing with the meaning of the Contracts Clause
in the Blaisdell case,119 Stone suggested frankly: "We are ...
confronted with a problem permeating the economic structure, of
which Chief Justice Marshall probably never had any conception
..120 After becoming Chief Justice, Stone confessed to Charles
Evans Hughes that he felt that both he and Hughes had to "bear ...
some burdens which John Marshall did not know."121
Yet another prominent architect of the New Deal, Felix
Frankfurter, acknowledged Marshall's greatness as Chief Justice
repeatedly during Frankfurter's years as a prominent academic and
subsequently as a Supreme Court justice. Yet, Frankfurter's
reverence, like that of Thayer and Holmes, was not merely
reflexive-it included recognition of the limitations of Marshall's
118. MASON, supra note 101, at 503 (citation omitted).
119. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
120. MASON, supra note 101, at 364 (citation omitted in original).
121. Id. at 574 (citation omitted in original).
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reasoning and even its incompatibility with Frankfurter's own
principled views regarding judicial self-restraint. For Frankfurter,
the challenge in constitutional adjudication (and, for that matter;
academic commentary) invariably consisted of trying to balance his
respect for Marshall with his own well-known convictions and
advocacy for judicial restraint.
To be sure, in the mid-1930s, prior to his appointment to the
Court, Frankfurter had a relatively easy time maintaining this
balance. In this period, his most extensive disquisition on Marshall
occurred in 1936-a little more than two years before his own
appointment to the Court-in a series of lectures at the University
of North Carolina.122 In the lectures, he compared the substantive
views and methodologies of Chief Justices Marshall, Taney, and
Waite in Commerce Clause cases. Frankfurter was especially
impressed with the fact that in construing the Commerce Clause,
"Marshall had, as it were, the duty of creation to a degree greater
than falls to the lot of even most great judges. When he was called
upon to apply the [CI ommerce [Clause, he had available no fund of
mature or coherent speculation regarding its implications."'23
Nevertheless,
it]emperament, experience and association converged to make
it easy for Marshall to use the commerce clause as a curb upon
local legislation.... The need of a strong central government, as
the indispensable bulwark of the solid elements of the nation,
was for him the deepest article of his political faith. But while he
had rooted principles, he was pragmatic in their application. No
less characteristic than the realization of the opportunities
presented by the commerce clause to restrain local legislatures
from hampering the free play of commerce among the states,
was his empiricism in not tying the Court to rigid formulas for
accomplishing such restrictions. His mind carried a hardheaded
appreciation of the complexities of government, particularly in
a federal system.'24
122. See Felix Frankfurter, The Commerce Clause Under Marshall, in 3 THE MARSHALL
READER: THE LIFEAND CONTRIBUTIONS OF CHIEFJUSTICE JOHN MARSHALL 151-72 (Erwin C.
Surrency ed., 1955) [hereinafter THE MARSHALL READER].
123. Id. at 152.
124. Id. at 152-53.
14252002]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Although Frankfurter regarded Marshall's "opinion" in Gibbons v.
Ogden125 as "either unconsciously or calculatedly confused," 6
Frankfurter believed, "[wihat Marshall merely adumbrated in
Gibbons v. Ogden became central to our whole constitutional
scheme: the doctrine that the commerce clause, by its own force and
without national legislation, puts it into the power of the Court to
place limits upon state authority."'27 Frankfurter's review of
Marshall's opinions on the Commerce Clause led him further to
recognize that "[tihe history of the Commerce Clause, from the
pioneer efforts of Marshall to our own day, is the history of
imposing artificial patterns upon the play of economic life whereby
an accommodation is achieved between the interacting concerns of
states and nation."12 Throughout this history, Frankfurter
suggests, Marshall helped to lay the groundwork for the Court's
Commerce Clause decisions, which have been, in Frankfurter's
view, "exercise[s] in statesmanship hemmed in by the restrictions
attending the adjudicatory process. ... [Moreover,] Marshall's
commerce clause decisions reflect both his awareness of the
problems of statecraft cast into legal issues, and the tentative,
experimental adjustments within the legal process whereby
adjustments without are made." " The fatal mistake made by
subsequent justices, in Frankfurter's judgment, was not to
appreciate the significance of Marshall's endeavors. "What in
Marshall was the beginning of analysis, for lesser judges became
tags. Judges throughout the land rested on an uncritical use of the
police power, and rendered mechanical decisions in Marshall's
name. "
130
In the remainder of his remarks, Frankfurter sought to dispel the
most common misconceptions and myths circulating about
Marshall. While he conceded, for instance, that some of the
arguments employed by Marshall in his Commerce Clause decisions
were drawn from some of the great lawyers (especially Daniel
Webster) who appeared before him, Frankfurter recognized that
125. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
126. Frankfurter, supfa note 122, at 154.
127. Id. at 155.
128. Id. at 157.
129. Id. at 158.
130. Id. at 164.
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"not the least distinction of a great judge is his capacity to
assimilate, to modify and reject the discursive and subtly partisan
arguments of counsel and to transform their raw materials into an
enduring opinion."3 ' Nor did Marshall merely dominate or assert
his views over the protests or ignorance of his colleagues; Gibbons,
for instance, "was an orchestral and not a solo performance."'32 The
same was true of other seminal Commerce Clause opinions
authored by Marshall but, as the product of a collegial endeavor,
"indulge[d] in observations beyond the necessities of the case and
outside the requirement of his own analysis." 3' In agreement with
Holmes, Frankfurter concluded that Marshall's great achievement
was that
Marshall... was there. Marshall must have felt it. Certainly he
seized every opportunity to educate the country to a spacious
view of the Constitution, to accustom the public mind to broad
national powers, and to restrict the old assertiveness of the
states. He imparted such a momentum to these views that it
carried the Court in his general direction beyond his own time.
But he had too much of an instinct for the practical to attempt
rigidities which could not possibly bind the future. He wished to
promote the national power, but he left open the choice of
doctrine for the attainment of his purpose. And so his views
were often tentative and suggestive; they conveyed cross
currents of doctrine and purposed ambiguity."&
In short, Marshall's opinions were not "literary documents" but
rather "events in American history."
3 5
Within a year of Frankfurter's lectures at the University of North
Carolina, he was deeply involved in advising President Roosevelt on
his Court-packing plan. One important document was Frankfurter's
draft of Roosevelt's Constitution Day speech of September 17, 1937,
131. Id. at 170.
132. Id. at 171.
133. Id. For a more detailed account of the extent to which Marshall modified his views
to cultivate unanimous opinions, see William W. Crosskey, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, in
Ma. JUSTICE, supra note 39, at 17.
134. Frankfurter, supra note 122, at 171-72.
135. Id. at 172.
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in which the President defended the plan. In one revealing portion,
Frankfurter's memorandum suggested:
The most important sentence ever written by Chief Justice
Marshall is a part of the opinion in which over one hundred
years ago that great Chief Justice established the
constitutionality of the legislation which saved the banking
system of this country in 1933 and insured the safety of your
deposits for the future. In that opinion Marshall, who had
fought through the Revolutionary War and had experienced all
the difficulties of his generation in the founding of a nation,
admonished those who would narrowly limit the great document
to remember "that it is a Constitution we are expounding."
And the modern Marshall-Mr. Justice Holmes-who like
Marshall had seen the price paid on the battlefield to establish
a nation, elaborated the thought of Marshall in these memorable
words: "the provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical
formulas having their essence in their form; they are organic
living institutions transplanted from English soil. Their
significance is vital not formal; it is to be gathered not simply by
taking the words and a dictionary, but by considering their
origin and the line of their growth."3 '
Frankfurter obviously felt the references to Holmes and Marshall
would resonate with the public; he repeated them again near the
end of his drafted speech:
We shall hold to this true course; we shall be most loyal to our
history and most reverent to the framers of the Constitution if
we view it as the great interpreters have always viewed it, as
Marshall viewed it, as Holmes viewed it.
Thus only will we be true to the avowed purposes of the
Constitution itself-"to form a more perfect Union, establish
Justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common
defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings
of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity."3 7
136. Draft ofPres. Franklin Roosevelt's Sept. 17,1937, Constitution Day speech prepared
by Felix Frankfurter, in ROOSEVELTANDFRANxFURTEI THEIRCORRESPONDENCE, 1928-1945,
at 413 (Max Freedman ed., 1967) (citation omitted).
137. Id. at 416-17 (citation omitted).
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Frankfurter's references to Marshall, before his own appointment
to the Court in 1939 and before Hughes and Roberts cast their
historic votes in pivotal Commerce Clause cases, 3 ' reveal the
nature of Marshall's influence over the emerging Commerce Clause
doctrine. Of particular significance was Frankfurter's recognition
that Marshall's opinions merely provided the starting points rather
than directed the final resolution of the contemporary Commerce
Clause issues before the Court. Once the Court settled those issues,
others arose that helped to divide the New Deal Democrats on the
Court. By the 1940s, the Court increasingly became engaged with
constitutional questions outside of the realm of the Commerce
Clause, specifically dealing with incorporation, the extent of
constitutional protection of noneconomic liberties, and the necessity
for redressing political processes weighted against unpopular
minorities. In dealing with these latter issues, Justice Frankfurter
confronted increasing pressure on and off the Court to reconcile his
pleas for judicial restraint with judicial protection of the affected
interests and political minorities, especially African-Americans.' 3 9
Thus, it is not surprising to find as his judicial career advanced,
Frankfurter grappled more openly with the limits of Marshall's
insights into judicial review. Indeed, the advent of the Warren
Court coincided not only with renewed interest in Marshall but also
with renewed analysis of the limits of judicial review.
V. THE ADVENT OF THE WARREN COURT
Even before Earl Warren became Chief Justice in 1953, there was
a resurgence of interest in Marshall's stature and achievements as
the Great Chief Justice. The year 1951 marked the 150th
anniversary of Marshall's appointment as Chief Justice. The
celebrations in that year hardly matched those in 1901, though
there were more than a few prominent speeches and articles
throughout the year reminding the public of the enduring legacy of
John Marshall. One of these was by Justice Harold Burton, who
wrote a notable tribute to Marshall as the presiding judge in the
138. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S. 502 (1934).
139. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Rhetoric of Judicial Critique: From Judicial Restraint
to the Virtual Bill of Rights, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. _ (forthcoming 2002).
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treason trial of Aaron Burr."1° Justice Burton praised the
seriousness and even-handedness of Marshall in presiding over the
trial. In Burton's estimation, Marshall presided with such fairness
that when the trial was over, "[tihe nation had reason to feel that,
when administered after the manner of Marshall, Justice is the
Guardian of Liberty."'
The stage was being set for even greater homage to be paid to
Marshall in 1955, the year of the bicentennial of his birth. It would
prove to be a remarkable year for John Marshall, the Constitution,
and the Supreme Court. To honor Marshall and to inaugurate
nationwide observance of September 1955 as "John Marshall
Bicentennial Month," both President Dwight D. Eisenhower and
Chief Justice Earl Warren addressed the annual convention of the
American Bar Association. One can find in each of their remarks on
that occasion oblique and sometimes not so oblique references to
another more recent event, the Supreme Court's remarkable,
unanimous opinion in Brown v. Board ofEducation.142 Decided little
more than a year before, Brown required yet another unanimous
opinion in 1955 to clarify the first important step in its imple-
mentation."'
President Eisenhower spoke first. His speech is striking for its
candid discussion of the principles he derived from Marshall's
example to guide his own judicial nominations, in spite of the
pressures he saw the Court confronting in 1955. At the outset, he
recognized that as Chief Justice Marshall
established himself, in character, in wisdom, and in his clear
insight into the requirements of free Government, as a shining
example for all later members of his profession.
140. Harold H. Burton, 'Justice the Guardian of Liberty": John Marshall at the Trial of
Aaron Burr, 37 A-B.A. J. 735 (1951), reprinted in 3 THE MARSHALL READER, supra note 122,
at 131.
141. Id. at 147. Justice Burton had praise as well for Aaron Burr who, in Burton's
estimation, "had presided in the Senate, with marked fairness and competency, over the
impeachment trial of Associate Justice Chase of the Supreme Court.... On leaving the Vice
Presidency, he had delivered to the Senate... an affecting farewell address marked with
expressions of strong devotion to his country and its Constitution." Id. at 147 n.1.
142. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
143. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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Through a generation, he expounded [about the Constitution
and federalism] and formulated decisions of such clarity and
vigor that we now recognize him as a foremost leader in
developing and maintaining the liberties of the people of the
United States.'"
Moreover, President Eisenhower credited Marshall with having
helped to
create among Americans a deep feeling of trust and respect for
the Judiciary. Rarely indeed has that respect been damaged or
that trust betrayed by a member of the Judicial branch of our
three-sided Government.
Americans realize that the independence and integrity and
capacity of the Judiciary are vital to our Nation's continued
existence. For myself, this realization is understandably with
me most sharply when it becomes my duty to make a
nomination to the Federal Bench. 145
With Brown an intensely recent memory, Eisenhower proceeded
to make his boldest statement as President about his intentions in
nominating judges: "You [of the ABA] have helped secure judges
who, I believe, will serve in the tradition of John Marshall. No other
kind will be appointed."" He explained in some detail precisely
what he meant by this pledge: "Obviously, a rough equality between
the two great political parties should be maintained on the Bench.
Thus we help assure that the Judiciary will realistically appraise
and apply precedent and principles in the light of current American
thinking, and will never become a repository of unbalanced partisan
attitudes."14
7
President Eisenhower then turned to the lessons that Marshall's
example had for judicial selection not just for the United States but
for other nations:
144. PresidentDwightD. Eisenhower, Address ofthe 78' Convention ofthe American Bar
Association (Aug. 24, 1955), in JOHN MARSHALL BICENTENNIAL CELEBRATION, 1955: FINAL
REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSIONFORTHE CELEBRATION OFTHE TWO HUNDREDTH
ANNIVERSARY OF THE BIRTH OF JOHN MARSHALL 76 (1955) [hereinafter JOHN MARSHALL
BICENTENNIAL].
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I feel that John Marshall's life and his works have even a more
profound significance than is to be found in our veneration for
the American courts and for his memorable services during the
formative years of the Republic.
The central fact of today's life is the existence in the world of
two great philosophies of man and of Government. They are in
contest for the friendship, loyalty, and support of the world's
peoples.
On the one side, our Nation is ranged with those who seek
attainment of human goals through a Government of laws
administered by men. Those laws are rooted in moral law ....
On the other side are those who believe-and many of them
with evident sincerity-that human goals can be most surely
reached by a Government of men who rule by decree. 141
President Eisenhower of course saw the United States as following
the first course rather than the second. Interestingly, he suggested
that in trying to maintain this first course the appropriate model
was John Marshall:
[Liet us be clear that, in the global scene, our responsibility as
Americans is to present our case as tellingly to the world as
John Marshall presented the case for the Constitution to the
American public more than a hundred years ago ...
In his written works and innumerable decisions, John
Marshall proved the adequacy and adaptability of the
Constitution to the Nation's needs. He was patient, tireless,
understanding, logical, persistent. He was-no matter how trite
the expression-a Crusader; his cause, the interpretation of the
Constitution to achieve ordered liberty and justice under law.
Now America needs to exercise, in the [international]
Crusade for peace, the qualities of John Marshall. ... [We need
to] stand uncompromisingly for principle, for great issues, with
the fervor of Marshall-with the zeal of the Crusader.49
Eisenhower emphasized that Marshall's vision was especially
relevant for providing the substance of the case the United States
148. Id.
149. Id. at 78.
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needed to make around the world for peace: "Our program must be
as dynamic, as forward looking, as applicable to the international
problems of our times as the Constitution, under John Marshall's
interpretations, was made flexible and effective in the promotion of
freedom, justice, and national strength in America."150 In short:
Our case for peace, based on justice, is as sound as was John
Marshall's for the Constitution and the Union. ... [As we work
for peace and justice around the world,] we shall prove
ourselves-lawyers and laymen alike-worthy heirs to the
example and spirit of John Marshall. Like him in his great
mission, we shall succeed.'
To an audience in 1955, President Eisenhower's remarks must
have been remarkable. His speech is one of the few instances in
which he showed no public ambivalence or personal discomfort with
either Brown or its implications for the future of civil rights.152 The
speech is also remarkable in part because it suggests, at least
implicitly, how the defense of the Court, in the immediate
aftermath of Brown, was connected to the President's domestic
and international agendas.5 ' Moreover, President Eisenhower's
remarks represent the last time that a Republican president openly
has acknowledged and indeed praised adapting the Constitution to
meet current problems by means of judicial construction.'54
Following the President was Chief Justice Earl Warren, who had
been appointed less than three years before. Chief Justice Warren
offered an even more passionate defense of Marshall's legacy and
drew even more lessons from it than Eisenhower for contemporary
attitudes about judicial review. He found fitting celebration of the
occasion in Philadelphia, for it "was here that John Marshall,
150. Id at 79.
151. Id. at 80-81.
152. See JAMES PATrERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS 392-94 (1996) (explaining Eisenhower's
response to Brown); see also STEPHEN AMBROSE, EISENHOWER (1983).
153. See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
154. SubsequentRepublican presidents, including Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, George
H.W. Bush, and George W. Bush have come to the presidency as vigorous critics of judicial
activism and defenders ofjudicial restraint. Either as candidates orin office, none have made
any public defense of a broad construction of the Bill of Rights or the equal protection and
due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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expounder of the Constitution, [died] after making a contribution to
constitutional government unparalleled in history."'55 These
contributions were quickly recognized, in Warren's judgment, after
Marshall's death, when "he soon became judged by the rule of
reason rather than the rule of perfection."55 From the vantage point
of the bicentennial of Marshall's birth, Warren suggested the nation
could look back upon Marshall "as we would a lofty mountain
peak-not by the crevasses, jagged rocks, and slides that are
apparent at close view-but by the height, the symmetry, and the
grandeur it acquires in the perspective of distance."157 From this
perspective, "John Marshall stands out as a colossus among the
giants of his time..... [HIe left us a heritage of both freedom and
stability."5 ' The current generations challenge was to preserve the
legacy left by Marshall. "Our problems ... are as pressing as they
were in the days of John Marshall, and call for the same devotion
to constitutional principles."'59
In the remainder of his remarks, Chief Justice Warren drew
parallels between the principles Marshall helped to establish and
protect and the Court's ongoing responsibilities. Foremost among
these principles was "an independent judiciary" without which
"there can be no freedom" and whose success required courage. 60
Moreover,
[wlithout a militant bar to assert in court the constitutional
rights of individuals, regardless of how unpopular those
assertions might be at the moment, such rights become merely
sounding brass and tinkling cymbals.
Insistence upon the independence of the judiciary in the early
days of our Nation was perhaps John Marshall's greatest
contribution to constitutional law. He aptly stated the
controlling principle when in speaking of the court during his
tenure he said that they had never sought to enlarge the judicial
155. Chief Justice Earl Warren, Address at the 78th Convention of the American Bar
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power beyond proper bounds nor feared to carry it to the fullest
extent that duty requires.
That is precisely the obligation of the judiciary today.161
As Warren continued with the parallels between the pressures
faced and overcome by Marshall and by his own Court, he placed
increasing emphasis on the importance of the example that the
Court could set for the world:
In Marshall's day the paramount problem was that of
implementing the National Government so that it would have
the strength to perpetuate itself and command respect, both at
home and abroad.
Through the years, that had been accomplished to a
remarkable degree.... Freedom has been preserved. Marshall's
goal has been achieved.
But we now live in a different kind of world, an ideological
world which disagrees violently on the proper relationship
between the individual and the state, and in which there is a
constant struggle for the minds and hearts of people.
We, and other free countries, are endeavoring to demonstrate
that freedom and dignity for all constitute the only sound basis
for world peace.
In such a gigantic struggle, where the eyes of a critical world
are constantly upon everyone, the power of example is far more
colorful than that of precept.'62
Chief Justice Warren's remarks signal at least as clearly as
President Eisenhower's that the legitimacy of the Court's
overturning of state-mandated segregation depended to some extent
on the Cold War, and vice versa.6 3 He concluded: "Thus interpreted
and applied, the constitutional principles of John Marshall will take
161. Id. at 82-83.
162. Id. at 83.
163. President Eisenhower's and Chief Justice Warren's explicit attempts to connect the
Cold War with the Court's obvious efforts as early as 1955 to dismantle state-mandated
segregation were of course no accident, and they provide as clear confirmation as any of the
extent to which the political and international circumstances under which these cases arose
influenced their content, direction, and legitimacy. See generally Mary Dudziak,
Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61 (1988); see also Michael
Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213 (1991).
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on even added luster through the years. No higher mission could be
the lot of the bar and the bench of America than to achieve this
purpose and we grasp the opportunity."164
Later in the same year, Chief Justice Warren returned to some
of the same themes in a speech given upon the presentation of a
bust of John Marshall in Williamsburg, Virginia. In commenting
upon the origins of the American legal system and its Constitution,
the Chief Justice observed:
It fell to the lot of John Marshall to translate our Constitution
from paper into real life, to enable it to meet the problems of a
new, poor, war-tired and divided country. To say that it took
wisdom, foresight, patience and courage to do this task is trite.
But it is none the less true, and he did it for 34 years during the
most formative and politically turbulent period of our national
history, leaving at his death a greater imprint on our legal
institutions than any American to this day has ever made.'65
Warren discussed the intense disputes dividing American leaders,
at the time of Marshall's tenure, between "those who would center
most power in the Federal Government" and "those who would
leave practically all power in the states."166 Warren regarded
Marshall's management of this dispute as one of his greatest
legacies:
It was Marshall's mission in life to pursue a course somewhere
between those two extreme positions through the construction
of the new Constitution in a myriad of cases that arose during
his thirty-four years as Chief Justice.... He believed in a strong,
central government-federal supremacy in all matters within
the domain of the Federal Government. He believed the
Constitution should be construed liberally to accomplish that
end, and he confirmed the power of Congress to do so in
[McCulloch v. Maryland].
164. Chief Justice Earl Warren, Address at the 78'" Convention of the American Bar
Association (Aug. 24, 1955), in JOHN MARSHALL BICENTENNIAL, supra note 144, at 83.
165. Chief Justice Earl Warren, Address and Presentation of the Bust of John Marshall
at the College of William & Mary (Sept. 25, 1954), in MARSHALL-WYTHE-BLACKSTONE
COMMEMORATION CEREMONIES, 56 (College of William & Mary 1954).
166. Id. at 57.
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He believed that if we were to remain a nation we must have
a national economy, and that any strong economy must be based
upon the scrupulous performance of contracts, and the orderly
regulation by the central government of commerce among the
states and with other nations. He realized that if we were to
command the respect of the world, we must meticulously fulfill
our international obligations and honor the treaties we make.
All of these desired results he achieved through decision after
decision until they became embedded in our law.16
Yet John Marshall's "greatest contribution" was not any particular
decision but rather, as Warren had suggested previously to the
ABA, "the establishment of an independent judiciary through the
principle of judicial review."16 Through the exercise of this power,
"in accordance with his belief, stone by stone, [Marshall] built the
foundation of our constitutional structure, and he constructed it
sufficiently strong to support everything we have since built upon
it." 69 Warren recognized the political retaliation that confronted
Marshall as he tried to build this edifice, "but he continued to build,
patiently, logically, courageously. His sense of duty is epitomized at
the time of the trial of Aaron Burr, which he conducted fearlessly
in spite of the intense feeling of the public and the national
administration against the defendant."'70 Marshall never flinched
from doing his duty in the face of constant political pressure against
him. When he died, his steadfastness won him "acclaim[] by friend
and foe alike as a man of virtue and great accomplishment."'71
In that same year in September, Justice Frankfurter commenced
a conference at Harvard Law School commemorating Marshall's
birth. Written almost twenty years after his lectures on Marshall's
Commerce Clause decisions at the University of North Carolina,
Justice Frankfurter's speech, later published as an article in the
Harvard Law Review, is striking for at least two reasons. The first
is that it reflects the same if not greater reverence Frankfurter had
exhibited in his earlier remarks on Marshall's legacy. In many
instances, Frankfurter expands on and waxes even more poetic
167. Id. at 57-58.
168. Id. at 58.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 59.
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than he had in his prior praise for Marshall. Second, Justice
Frankfurter segues in the latter half of his speech into an
examination of the limits and promise ofjudicial review. It is in this
latter portion of his speech that one can perceive the impact of
intervening events and his public service on his constitutional
outlook.
The first significant theme of the speech is the case for John
Marshall's distinctive ranking among Supreme Court justices.
Justice Frankfurter suggested that
the decisive claim to John Marshall as a great statesman is as
a judge. And he is the only judge who has that distinction. It
derives from the happy conjunction of Marshall's qualities of
mind and character, the opportunities afforded by the Court
over which he was called to preside, the duration of his service,
and the time in which he served-the formative period in the
country's history.'72.
Working virtually on a blank slate insofar as constitutional
meaning and explication were concerned, Marshall
gave institutional direction to the inert ideas of a paper scheme
of government. Such an achievement demanded an undimmed
vision of the union of states as a nation and the determination
of an uncompromising devotion to such insight. Equally
indispensable was the power to formulate views expressing this
outlook with the persuasiveness of compelling simplicity."3
Frankfurter explained further the lasting power of Marshall's
ideas, diffused in all sorts of ways, especially through the
influence of the legal profession, [which] have become the
presuppositions of our political institutions. He released an
enduring spirit, a mode of approach for generations of judges
charged with the awesome duty of subjecting the conduct of
government and the claims of individual rights to the
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touchstone of a written document, binding the Government and
safeguarding such rights.174
Of all of these ideas Frankfurter found none more significant
than Marshall's recognition that 'it is a constitution we are
expounding,'" which Frankfurter stresses as "the single most
important utterance in the literature of constitutional law-most
important because most comprehensive and comprehending."17 Yet,
Frankfurter goes further to caution his listeners not .to imbue
Marshall with infallibility. "It is important not to make untouchable
dogmas of the fallible reasoning of even our greatest judge, and not
to attribute godlike qualities to the builders of our nation."176
After dispelling the persistent myths regarding Marshall's
shortcomings (indeed, the same myths he had tried to dispel twenty
years before), Frankfurter discussed the distinctive attributes of
Marshall's methodology. Marshall "was not dogmatic in the choice
of doctrine" for promoting adequate national power.'77 "He eschewed
precedents, such as were then available, in his opinions for the
Court. But he showed mastery in treatment of precedents where
they had been relied on for an undesirable result."17 And
Frankfurter heartily endorsed an appraisal of Marshall's abilities
by a contemporary, who found Marshall's mind to be "creative, so
well organized by nature, or disciplined by early education, and
constant habits of systematick [sic] thinking, that [Marshall
embraced] every subject with the clearness and facility of one
prepared by previous study to comprehend and explain it." 17 9
At this juncture, Justice Frankfurter moved into a discussion of
the progression of judicial review since Marshall's time. In
reviewing this progression, Frankfurter openly acknowledged the
significance of his own intellectual heritage:
One brought up in the traditions of James Bradley Thayer,
echoes of whom were still resounding in this very building in my
student days, is committed to Thayer's statesmanlike conception
174. Id.
175. Id. at 218-19 (citation omitted).
176. Id. at 219.
177. Id. at 223.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 224 (citation omitted).
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of the limits within which the Supreme Court should move, and
I shall try to be loyal to his admonition regarding the restricted
freedom of members of that Court to pursue their private
views. 1
80
From this perspective, Justice Frankfurter described the evolution
of constitutional law since the days of Marshall, who
would be amazed by the interpenetration of law in government,
because during his whole era he was concerned with the
Constitution as an instrument predominantly regulating the
machinery of government, and more particularly, distributing
powers between the central government and the states. The
Constitution was not thought of as the repository of the supreme
law limiting all government, with a court wielding the deepest-
cutting power of deciding whether there is any authority in
government at all to do what is sought to be done.'8 '
Frankfurter explained, "The vast change in the scope of law
between Marshall's time and ours is at bottom a reflection of the
vast change in the circumstances of society."'82
At the end of his speech, Justice Frankfurter suggested that
perhaps the greatest lesson he had learned in his tenure on the
Court up until that point was the difficulty of the challenge to hew
closely to the limits of judicial review. He recognized that he had
an old-fashioned liberal's view of government and law .... [The
label] implies allegiance to the humane and gradualist tradition
in dealing with refractory social and political problems,
recognizing them to be fractious because of their complexity and
not amenable to quick and propitious solutions without resort to
methods which deny law as the instrument and offspring of
reason.
183
The important thing for judges to do is to respect their inability to
resolve such problems on their own. Hence, Justice Frankfurter
180. Id. at 225.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 226.
183. Id. at 237.
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refrained from "fashion[ing] criteria for easier adjudication of the
specific cases that will trouble future judges."84 Moreover, he
acknowledged having
tried to dispel the age-old illusion that the conflicts to which the
energy and ambition and imagination of the restless human
spirit give rise can be subdued, even if not settled, by giving the
endeavors of reason we call law a mechanical or automatic or
enduring configuration. Law cannot be confined within any
such mould because life cannot be so confined. Man's most
piercing discernment of the future cannot see very far beyond
his day, even when guided by the prophet's insight and the
compassionate humility of a Lincoln. And I am the last to
claim that judges are apt to be endowed with these gifts. But
a fair appraisal of Anglo-American judicial history ought to
leave us not without encouragement that modest goals,
uncompromisingly pursued, may promote what I hope you will
let me call civilized ends without the need of defining them."5
Frankfurter concluded with a twist on his usual plea for judicial
self-restraint:
The intention of my emphasis has been not on the limited scope
of judicial enforcement of laws. My concern is an
affirmation-my plea is for the pervasiveness throughout the
whole range of government of the spirit of law, at least in the
sense of excluding arbitrary official action. But however limited
the area of adjudication may be, the standards of what is fair
and just set by courts in controversies appropriate for their
adjudication are perhaps the single most powerful influence in
promoting the spirit of law throughout government.1 6
Judges had a special responsibility in promoting this spirit: For
"judges cannot free themselves from the responsibility of the
inevitable effect of their opinions in constricting or promoting the
force of law throughout government. Upon no functionaries is there
a greater duty to promote law."8 7
184. Id
185. Id.
186. Id. at 237-38.
187. Id. at 238.
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In yet another speech in 1955, Justice Burton continued his own
homage to John Marshall. As part of a symposium in honor of the
bicentennial of Marshall's birth, Justice Burton published his own
account of Marshall's personal and professional accomplishments.'"
The account mixes established fact with hagiography. At the outset,
Burton praised Marshall as "a vigorous, courageous, warmhearted,
and modest man, exemplifying the best traditions of the American
revolution." 189 Moreover, "[u]nder [Marshall's] leadership, the
loose stones provided for the nation's structure were built into a
firm foundation," and his "conduct" in overseeing Aaron Burr's
treason trial "set an admirable example of judicial courage and
demeanor."' Burton concluded his speech, as Warren had ended
his earlier in the year, with a reference to the dramatic cracking of
the Liberty Bell at the moment it "announce [d] his death. His active
service and that of the bell ended together.... Their voices were
silenced, but they have never ceased to inspire the nation to seek to
fulfill the high mission to which both Marshall and the bell were
dedicated."' 9'
These homages to Marshall were the first salvos in a highly
visible, intense debate over the legitimacy of the Warren Court's
activist decision in Brown. Critics of this activism did not hesitate
to draw negative inferences from suggested parallels between
the Warren and Marshall Courts. For instance, in 1957 the
conservative columnist James J. Kilpatrick published a book
denouncing the Warren Court's failures to respect state
sovereignty, which he traced back to the nationalist bias of John
Marshall.'92 In his Preface, he predicted that "[tihe political heirs
of Alexander Hamilton and John Marshall will not care much for"
188. Harold H. Burton, John Marshall-The Man, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 3 (1955). Burton's
interest in John Marshall was evident throughout his tenure on the Court. See Harold H.
Burton, The Cornerstone of Constitutional Law: The Extraordinary Case of Marbury v.
Madison, 36 A.B.A. J. 805 (1950) (discussing Marshall's handling of the case); see also
Burton, supra note 140.
189. Burton, John Marshall-The Man, supra note 188, at 3.
190. Id. at 6.
191. Id. at 7.
192. JAMES J. KILPATRICK, THE SOVEREIGN STATES: NOTES OF A CITIZEN OF VIRGINIA
(1957).
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his strong support for state sovereignty and the doctrine of
interposition.
193
Subsequently, Marshall's image hardly has been dormant. Over
the past five decades (and counting), it has figured prominently in
numerous debates on and off the Court regarding the legitimacy of
the Warren Court's activism, the Burger Court's failure to
implement a constitutional revolution and realize its promise to
undo many of the Warren Court's landmark decisions, and the
Rehnquist Court's overturning of more than two dozen federal
laws in recent years for the sake of protecting state sovereignty
and restricting the scope of congressional authority, particularly
under the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 4 These debates encompass periods in which the
nation has celebrated the bicentennials of both the Bill of Rights
and John Marshall's appointment as Chief Justice. These are the
debates (and celebrations) of the modern era, and they are likely
to be familiar to us,' 95 as are of course our own conceptions of
Marshall's stature and legacy. While I leave for another day more
detailed analysis of Marshall's different and recurring images in the
modern era, one can presume that throughout the period national
leaders, with rare exceptions, have not hesitated to make recourse
to Marshall's image whenever they needed authority to confirm the
legitimacy of the national government deriving from the people of
the United States, to defend the independence of the federal
judiciary, to support broad constructions of Congress's Commerce
Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause powers, and to justify
judicial construction of the Constitution to meet the pressing issues
of the day.
193. Id. at xi.
194. On the Court's activities under the chieflusticeships of Warren Burger and William
Rehnquist, see generally Gerhardt, supra note 139.
195. See, e.g., Tom Campbell, Scalia Lauds Marshall for His Influence, Example, RICH.
TIMES DISPATCH, Feb. 4,2001, at B3 (explaining the continuing "influence" ofJohn Marshall
as "present even in the form today's opinions take" and acknowledging, "I am saddened when
I compare his performance not only to my own but to other public officials"); Harry L.
Carrico, The Illustrious Legacy of John Marshall Endures, RIcH. TIMES DISPATCH, Feb. 4,
2001, at F7 (the remarks of the Chief Justice of Virginia Supreme Court in recognition of
Marshall's greatness as ajudge, concluding that "ftlo gauge the extent of Marshal's legacy,
one need only guess what this country would have become without him. That we are a nation
governed by a rule of law because he lived, there can be no doubt.").
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VI. MARSHALL AND THE MEASUREMENT OF JUDIcIAL GREATNESS
The shifting or evolving image of John Marshall from his death
until the advent of the Warren Court confirms Jack Balkin's
opinion that greatness depends primarily on how future generations
make use of the past." 6 Balkin suggests that the factors that
explain the continuing perception of Marshall as a great judge
include -his long tenure on the Court, his institutional role in
helping the Court to achieve a more important role in the political
order than it had before his arrival, his performance as an
intellectual leader who wrote on the subjects of critical importance
to the citizens of his day, his choice of opinions to write, and his
having been on the "right side" on most national disputes from the
viewpoint of subsequent generations. 9 ' While I agree with all of
these factors, I suggest there are other notable factors both beyond
and implicit within those recognized by Professor Balkin.
Indeed, the very first of the factors mentioned by Balkin bears
repeating. It seems obvious that longevity should matter to a
justice's stature, but it can hardly be taken for granted. This factor
is critical because the longer a justice serves the likelier he or she
will be involved in a wide range of constitutional issues of enduring
social and political importance. Longevity provides opportunities
indispensable to a justice's stature in the public mind. In the prior
parts of this Article, virtually every political leader whom I have
quoted on Marshall's image refers to his length of service. To be
sure, length of service, standing alone, hardly qualifies one for
greatness as a judge; there have been more than a few justices who
served for many years but who either were poor colleagues,
contributed little positive input into the Court's deliberations or
work product, lacked judicial temperament, or wrote few opinions
and added little to those they did not write. At the same time, there
have been other justices-notably, both Benjamin Cardozo and
Robert Jackson-who had relatively short tenures, but are
generally recognized for some significant opinions they wrote and
shaped and for what they might have accomplished had they lived
longer. Notably, other justices, such as Marshall, Oliver Wendell
196. Balkin, supra note 10.
197. Id.
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Holmes, and Hugo Black, each served for over thirty years on the
Court, during which they were actively involved in the Court's most
sensitive and important work. While the longevity of service of each
of these justices does not explain why they all are considered by
most commentators as among the greatest justices who served on
the Court, they took advantage of the opportunities their longevity
provided. In other words, how each of these justices used the
opportunities available by virtue of his longevity illuminates each's
distinctive judicial performance.
Second, the quality of a jurist's decisions or opinions is critical
to his stature. Many factors are relevant to an evaluation of
the quality of a jurist's decisions, including their relative
craftsmanship, creativity, influence, and durability. Craftsmanship
encompasses a justice's writing style, and there is no question
judicial greatness requires, inter alia, exemplary opinion-writing.
The style must be both distinctive and memorable. Writing an
opinion in an important case is one thing, but writing an opinion
that resonates beyond the facts of the case before the Court is quite
another. Few tend to look to the opinion in Roe v. Wade 9 as the
model of exemplary writing, but Brown's simple declarative
sentences resonate to this day. The written opinions of a justice
constitute the lifeblood of his or her legacy. Marshall stood out in
his day and since for both how and what he wrote about the great
issues of his day. Almost every law student and lawyer (and many
high school students) are aware of his great pronouncements
regarding the Constitution in part because of his forceful rhetoric.'99
Marshall is known for having borrowed language or arguments
from briefs before the Court, but much of his most remarkable
language bears his unique rhetorical flourishes. Justice Cardozo
described Marshall's style as magisterial, because it eschewed
formalisms and technical language and uninformative analogies
and instead captured the essence of legal issues in bold, clear
language that was (and remains) accessible to the public.0 0 Justice
Holmes's pithiness-his ability to craft memorable phrasings and
epigrams in notable cases-remains a hallmark of his long
198. 410 U.S. 705 (1973).
199. See supra notes 14, 73, 88 and accompanying text.
200. See KAUFMAN, supra note 107, at 447.
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tenure.201 Charles Evans Hughes cast his arguments not only in
clear, powerful logic but also achieved similarly majestic resonances
in his writing as Marshall did.2 °2 Hugo Black purposely set out to
write opinions the press could quote and the public could
understand."3 Robert Jackson is admired for his eloquent turn of
phrase and some of the most memorable images ever constructed in
Supreme Court opinions, 204 and Felix Frankfurter is admired for his
remarkable erudition and passionate argumentation in defense of
judicial restraint at times when controversy enveloped the Court.0 5
Few, however, continue to revere the opinions of Justice Horace
Gray, though he was widely admired in his day by other judges for
his even-handedness, learning, and temperament; Gray's style does
not transcend time because it is dry, technical, and long-winded.0 6
Nor did Taney ever match the simple but powerful elegance of
201. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J. dissenting) (MThe
Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics."). Abhorrent
today, but no less well known, is Justice Holmes' oft quoted 1927 statement in Buck v. Bell,
274 U.S. 200 (1927), that "[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough." Id. at 207.
202. See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (declaring the
original understanding of the Constitution irrelevant); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697
(1931) (declaring freedom of the press and freedom of speech to be incorporated by the
Fourteenth Amendment). As David Currie notes, "Hughes wrote concisely and admirably"
and was "the authoritative voice of the... Court... who wrote nearly twice as many majority
opinions in constitutional cases as any other member of the Court, including most of the big
ones .... " DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT- THE SECOND
CENTURY, 1888-1986, at 273 (1990).
203. ROGER NEWmAN, HUGO BLACK A BIOGRAPHY 276 (2d ed. 1997) (noting that Justice
Black deliberately wrote for public consumption). Black explained that he wrote his opinions
so that "my uncle down on the farm plowing the fields can read them." Id. at 292 (internal
quotations omitted) (quoting Newman's interview with Hugo L. Black). Black strived to make
his opinions accessible to the public whom he saw as the ultimate beneficiary of the Court's
work. Id. Hence, Black was one of the first justices to have been widely covered by the press,
and that coverage, in turn, increased his notoriety with the public. See id. at 276 (quoting
from an interview with Guido Calabresi who claimed that Haywood Brown once remarked
that "Black is certainly popular with the newspaper men ... because he recently wrote a
dissent in English as plain and simple and clear as a good running story on the first page.
And, naturally, reporters take to those who speak their own language. And it is a finer
tongue than that invented by Mr. Blackstone."').
204. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641-46 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (setting out a memorable three-prong framework of executive
power); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (providing a
memorable description of the purpose of the Bill of Rights).
205. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266-330 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
206. This is equally true for his long speech in honor of the centennial of Marshall's
appointment as Chief Justice. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
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Marshall's rhetoric, preferring instead to cast his opinions in
relatively formal, passionless phrasing.
207
Creativity and innovation are also important attributes of a
judge's opinions. Marshall introduced into the constitutional lexicon
conceptions about judicial review, constitutional interpretation, and
congressional power that still influence or inform contemporary
doctrine, thinking, and debate on constitutional questions. While
creativity or innovation for its own sake can be problematic in
judging (consider, for example, how poorly many opinions of
William D. Douglas wear with age), Marshall's creativity and
innovations strengthened the Court's stature and have fared better
in part because of their reception by other institutional leaders over
time.
20 8
207. Taney's style contrasts sharply with Marshall's. Whereas Marshall cast his opinions
in magisterial terms, Taney, as one of the radical Democrats of his era, wrote opinions that
might have seemed less pompous and presumptuous to him but also were devoid of much
memorable imagery or craftsmanship.
208. Judge Posner agrees that creativity and innovation are relevant indicia of a judge's
stature. In a recent essay, he gives Marshall enormous credit for his ingenuity in helping to
lead the Court to keep the nation unified and not collapsing "into a set of completely
independent nation-states .... John Marshall's Court did much to check these fissiparous
tendencies. For this, most of us are profoundly grateful." Posner, supra note 6, at 39. He
suggests that "[i]t was the extraordinary fit between Marshall's kit of qualities and the
volatile historical setting in which he worked that explains his success and his greatness."
Id.
Professor Michael Klarman does not, however, consider creativity or innovativeness as
indicia of the greatness of ajudge's opinions. Instead, in a recent article he is skeptical of the
greatness of Chief Justice Marshall's opinions. Michael J. Klarman, How Great Were the
"Great"Marshall Court Decisions?, 87VA. L. REV. 1111,1112 (2001). He rejects the view that
Marshall's opinions "fundamentally shaped the course of American national development"
and instead demonstrates how opinions such as Gibbons or McCulloch had little concrete
effect." Id. at 1112, 1144. While Professor Klarman recognizes that the Court's "stature...
did increase dramatically under Marshall's leadership" and how in particular Marshall's
"brilliant political gamesmanship ... contributed to the growth of the Court's stature," he
suggests that Marshall's Court also benefitted from "some good fortune" including, inter alia,
the failure to convict Justice Samuel Chase in his impeachment trial and "the general
concordance of views shared by the Justices." I& at 1153, 1158, 1165, 1169.
Professor Klarman may take far too narrow a view of the indicia ofjudicial greatness. The
fact that an opinion fails to produce significant social and political consequences hardly is the
only measure by which it may be evaluated. The fact that an opinion-or series of
opinions-might have consolidated rather than precipitated social or political developments
is another reasonable measure of significance. Moreover, the fact that Marshall's opinions
sometimes reflected rather than led a political movement help to explain their favorable
reception by political elites long after the death of the Federalist party. In addition, the fact,
as recognized by Professor Kiarman, that a sea-change in the stature of the Court vis-d-vis
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Third, the relevance of a jurist's leadership on and off the Court
to his enduring significance cannot be overestimated. Such
leadership manifests itself in many ways. One is how a justice
interacts with his colleagues or builds coalitions on the Court. It is
hard to imagine ajustice more skilled at these endeavors than John
Marshall. Moreover, Marshall seems to have keenly understood the
importance of treating one's enemies as well as one could. It is no
accident that Marshall, in spite of his strong constitutional
opinions, commanded the respect of almost everyone with whom he
served in spite of the fact that most did not share his ideology. In
spite of the differences he had with Taney, Marshall expressed
respect for his legal abilities and tried to help him secure
confirmation as an Associate Justice. In the end, justices who did
not agree with Marshall on constitutional issues could at least
agree on his collegiality, decency, and even-handed administration
of the Court. They understood better than anyone how much
Marshall sometimes compromised his own personal views to
cultivate a majority or unanimous opinion for the Court. These
efforts paid dividends during Marshall's lifetime in the collegial
atmosphere over which he presided and in the good will of almost
every justice who served with him.
An important ingredient of leadership is clarity if not boldness of
vision, particularly with respect to the Constitution. Leadership
entails coordinating institutional implementation of an agenda. To
the extent a justice identifies both a clear resolution of an
important issue (or set of issues) and path by which to get there, he
distinguishes himself in the short-if not long-term. Marshall
often coordinated the implementation of his vision of the
Constitution. Indeed, the bolder the vision arguably the more
difficult the implementation, but Marshall often seemed to have
succeeded.
Marshall's leadership also entailed implementing a huge change
in the Court's operation: he led the Court to abolish its previous
the other branches occurred during Marshall's tenure as Chief Justice is itself another
reasonable measure of his leadership on the Court. Indeed, KIarman unduly discounts the
cumulative effects of the Marshall Court decisions on how the institutional leadership of the
other branches come to view the Court both during Marshall's tenure and subsequent to his
death.
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practice by which each justice would deliver an opinion in each case
and to substitute assignment to one justice to write an opinion for
the Court. This innovation enabled the Court from Marshall's time
to the present to specify with a single voice.
Interestingly, matching boldness of vision with a majestic style
ofwritingis a powerful combination likely to capture attention. The
best writing without a powerful or appealing vision is, however,
unlikely to resonate to the same extent; and no vision is likely to
have much appeal without suitable phrasing. For the most part,
justices who tended to decide cases incrementally (because they
envisioned a relatively narrow judicial role), such as Byron White,0 9
Potter Stewart, 10 and perhaps Lewis Powell,211 often commanded
the respect of their colleagues (to be sure, no mean feat), which they
all did, but are less likely to receive nearly the extent of public
attention or acclaim that justices with more capacious views have
received. A bolder vision seems more courageous-some might say
reckless-because it stretches boundaries and likely requires
considerable skill to implement. Marshall's nationalist ideology
obviously qualifies as such a vision.
Perhaps most importantly, we should also remember, as Jack
Balkin reminds us, who judges judicial greatness.212 There are
many different audiences and constituencies. Judges are obviously
important consumers of judicial opinions, but their criteria are
likely not to be divorced from either their methodologies or
substantive visions of constitutional law. Another important
consumer of judicial opinions are national political leaders,
including the president and members of Congress. When Jack
Balkin speaks of ajustice having been on the "right side" of an issue
insofar as the country is concerned, he means, I think, being on the
side of the issue that political leaders and perhaps other judges
endorse..2 In other words, the political process becomes another
critical forum for measuring judicial greatness. Marshall's opinions
often tracked the dominent federal regime, but in doing so they
garnered the regime's respect and enhanced the Court's stature.
209. See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 37, at 210-11.
210. See, e.g., id. at 205-07.
211. See, e.g., id, at 264-67.
212. See Balkin, supra note 10.
213. Id. at 1325-27.
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Taney's efforts to use this stature to achieve different ends came to
naught, for after his tragic opinion in Dred Scott,21' Taney became
a political pariah, at least insofar as national political leaders were
concerned by the 1860s. Few dared to point to any Taney opinion as
a model unless they were prepared to be challenged if not
castigated. As Taney's star fell, Marshall's arguably began to rise
further. By the 1950s, one could speak of Marshall's greatness
without fear of political retaliation and with perhaps the hope of
enhancing one's own stature with the listening or reading audience.
Indeed, positive reception within the political community is perhaps
not just a measure of judicial greatness but also required for a
sustained legacy. The celebrations of key moments in Marshall's
career reinforce if not further heighten his stature. By the same
token, that no one celebrates the milestones in Taney's career-in
spite of the respect many scholars have had for his nonslavery
opinions-is further testimony to just how far he has fallen in the
public regard.
The critical factor I am discussing-the extent of a justice's
popularity, appeal, influence, or stature in political fora-might be
the single most important measure of judicial greatness. For it
provides both the means of recognizing judicial greatness and its
perpetuation through the appointments of other like-minded people.
Hence, the political stature of a justice is a factor that could be
understood as subsuming the others-they merely contribute to the
political perception of a particular justice (or how a justice is
perceived in the political marketplace). Appointment or
confirmation of like-minded justices is, ultimately, perhaps the
highest praise any justice can receive.
Last but not necessarily least, judicial temperament is an
important element in ajudge's performance on the bench. Much has
been made of Marshall's fervent commitment to his Federalist
party's convictions, but much also should be said about his
willingness often to subvert his personal views for the sake of
institutional harmony. For Marshall to have formally dissented one
time in his unusually long tenure on the bench, especially when one
recalls how most of the other justices did not share his
constitutional convictions, is a remarkable achievement.
214. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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CONCLUSION
It is important not to confuse the public images of John Marshall
that recur through constitutional, congressional, and other debates
throughout history with the man who lived and worked as the third
Chief Justice of the United States. Thanks to historians such as
Chuck Hobson, Kent Newmyer, and Jean Edward Smith, we have
treatises that give us a sense of the real man behind these
images,215 but their wonderful works cannot obscure the fact that
the Marshall who dominates our debates is a different being from
the one whose bicentennial we celebrate today.
One question to consider is not just what image of Marshall each
of us has in mind but what purpose it serves. Marshall has become
almost unique in constitutional annals as a figure that time can no
longer diminish. Few regard him as perfect, but he stands apart
from his contemporaries for having led the Court to speak with one
voice and having uniquely helped to clarify (and even solidify) the
source of the power of the national government in the people of the
United States, the legitimacy of adapting the Constitution to meet
the pressing issues of the day, and the indispensable importance of
the independence of the federal judiciary. Moreover, in fashioning
these significant principles, Marshall has become a model ofjudicial
excellence. As such, he exemplifies some of the important attributes
that we seek in measuring the degree of others' influence or
accomplishments as Supreme Courtjustices-their length of service
on the Court, their rhetorical skills, their participation in and
influence over the resolution of politically and socially significant
conflicts, their leadership in helping the Court to maintain or
achieve its institutional role in our political and legal order, and
their crafting of opinions in distinctive and memorable writing
styles. If few, if any, justices can come close to matching Marshall
with respect to any of these factors, then the time is long overdue,
not to concede Marshall's place in our history, but to wonder why
he stands nearly, if not completely, alone. Clarifying not just
Marshall's greatness as a judge but also his uniqueness as a figure
215. See, e.g., CHARLES HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE
RULE OF LAW (1996); R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE
SUPREME COURT (2001); SMITH, supra note 8.
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in our constitutional history is a useful inquiry to initiate on the
occasion of the bicentennial of Marshall's appointment as Chief
Justice. It is indispensable in the ongoing quest to define his legacy.
